

Peter of Palude on Divine Concurrence: An Edition of His *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4

Introduction

The present text, question 4 of the first distinction of book II of Peter of Palude's commentary on the *Sentences*, is Peter's contribution to a larger thirteenth-century debate on divine concurrence, of which he is both a witness and participant. The debate concerned whether God is immediately active in every action of a creature, and if yes, what this divine concurring action amounts to. Peter was a Dominican theologian in Paris in the first half of the fourteenth century (†1342), possibly belonging to the circle of Durand of St.-Pourçain¹ but later also a chief participant of the investigations against the latter. As he presents the debate, it sprang from Aquinas's legacy and the various reactions to it, and thus can be regarded as mostly internal to the Dominican order (with the exception of Giles of Rome). Peter considers Aquinas's, Giles of Rome's, and Durand of St.-Pourçain's stance on the question before developing his own answer. In what follows, first I sketch some details of the debate as it was presented by Peter of Palude; second, I consider Peter's connection to Durand in some more detail; finally, I provide an edition of Peter of Palude's text. As will be seen below, Peter heavily relies on the accounts of his contemporaries; thus, what follows is not so much a groundbreaking fourteenth-century contribution to the debate but rather an interesting case study of the early Dominican reactions against Durand.

1. The Debate about Divine Concurrence

It would be both impossible and unnecessary to give here a comprehensive treatment of the thirteenth-century debate on divine concurrence. Some details of it have been

1. Jean Dunbabin, *A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-century Church* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 37 ff.

treated elsewhere, and overall, it will suffice to supply the necessary background to Peter's text, quickly reviewing the authors he discusses.

Aquinas's account of divine concurrence, as well as Giles's, Durand's, and Peter of Palude's reactions to it, derives from two claims to which they are committed. On the one hand, they maintain that individual natural agents efficaciously exercise causal powers; and, on the other hand, with the exception of Durand, also hold that God is causally involved, or, more precisely, is immediately active in the production of every natural effect.² The rejection of the first claim would amount to the acceptance of what later came to be called occasionalism; the rejection of the second claim would amount to the acceptance of mere conservationism.

Occasionalism, put rather crudely, holds that God is the only causally efficacious agent while creatures either have no causal powers or cannot exercise these powers efficiently. Thus, when a change occurs in the world, it is due to God's causal efficacy alone, while the creatures merely give occasion for God to exercise this efficacy. Varieties of the occasionalist view were known in the West as the positions of the Arabic thinkers, with whom Aquinas, Giles, Durand, and Palude were familiar through Maimonides's report of Al-Ghazali, Avicenna's *Fons Vitae*, and Avicenna (Averroes's refutation of Al-Ghazali was translated slightly later, in 1328).³ Unlike these Arabic thinkers and some early modern ones, however, most thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century authors, including Aquinas, Giles, Durand, and Peter of Palude, thought that we do experience causal interactions in the world,⁴ such as when a fire ignites a piece of cotton placed next to it. For Aquinas and Giles, occasionalism cannot account well for these everyday experiences of causal interactions, and indeed for sense experience itself (insofar as sense experience is taken to be caused by the sensed object).⁵

The history of mere conservationism is less known than that of occasionalism.⁶

2. The problem as I consider it now is restricted to efficient causation. Thus, the question might be rephrased as this: how is it that (1) created agents act as efficient causes, yet (2) God is also an efficient cause of everything?

3. For a history of Islamic and Western medieval occasionalism, see Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, *Occasionalismus: Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europaischen Denken* (Göttingen: Vandenhöck / Ruprecht, 2000).

4. The fourteenth century provides some counter examples to this claim, most famously Nicolas of Autrecourt, and perhaps Ockham.

5. Aquinas's fullest treatments are in *Summa contra gentiles* III, c.69, and in *De potentia*, q.3, a.7. For Giles, whose treatment is somewhat more detailed, see, e.g., *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q.4. Interestingly, neither Durand nor Palude deals with the occasionalist position at any length.

6. The position — starting perhaps with Alfred J Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is not Enough," *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991): 553–585 — has usually been labeled as 'mere conservationism' to indicate that *conservation* alone is

Mere conservationism, according to which God is not immediately active in the causal operations of the creatures but only conserves these creatures, was certainly not unknown in the earlier Middle Ages, although it seems not to have been a widely maintained view by the time of Aquinas.⁷ Perhaps this is the reason why Aquinas does not deal with it in detail, and Giles dismisses it relatively quickly as well. It is not a mere coincidence, therefore, that Durand has been the most well known mere conservationist, and indeed the only one cited by name by both Suarez and Malebranche.⁸

The argument Durand offers for mere conservationism is twofold: first, he shows that neither Aquinas's nor Giles's account is satisfactory; second, he argues that whether concurrentists regard God's action and the secondary agent's action as numerically identical or as numerically different, one of the actions will be superfluous.⁹ Peter of Palude will take up these arguments in his own commentary in order to refute them.

I will cite Durand's arguments against Aquinas and Giles when discussing the concurrentist positions. We should note, however, that the question where Durand argues against Aquinas and Giles is missing from the second redaction of his commentary (more about this in the next section). Whether this was already a result of some Dominican resistance is difficult to determine with certainty, although we might note that when Durand's teaching were examined for the first time in order to determine their orthodoxy, the records mention both that Durand had held this "erroneous and dangerous" position, as well as that it cannot be found in his "new" version of the commentary (redaction *B*). As we can read among the 93 propositions put together by the committee:

[17] The second book, first distinction, article 4, in his old ⟨version⟩ maintains and shows that God does not act immediately in the action of every

not sufficient to distinguish it from concurrentism, which also holds that God needs to conserve creatures during the time of their existence.

7. Albert the Great mentions that mere conservationism "mostly disappeared from the lecture halls, and many moderns regard it as heretical" (*In II Sent.*, d.35, a.7, resp.).

8. Suarez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp.22, sect.1; Nicolas Malebranche, *The Search after Truth*, ed. Paul J Olscamp and Thomas M Lennon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 680. Another mere conservationist who received some attention recently is Peter John Olivi; see Gloria Frost, "Peter Olivi's Rejection of God's Concurrence with Created Causes," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 22, no. 4 (October 2014): 655–679. On Durand's view, see Kurt Flasch, *Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter: Von Augustin zu Machiavelli* (Stuttgart: Reklam, 2013); and Johann Stufler, "Bemerkungen zur Konkurslehre des Durandus von St. Pourçain," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* Suppl. 3.2 (1935): 1080–1090.

9. For Durand's second, positive argument, see *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lines 148–214.

creature; but we do not find this in his new, second ⟨version⟩. Also, in the same place ⟨i.e., the first version⟩, at the end of the article he says that it is doubtful whether God has to coexist immediately with every creature with regard to everything that is in a creature — which perhaps, as he says, is not true unless only with regard to those things that are immediately from God himself. And this article is only in his old ⟨version⟩, not in the new one.

*If he means the exclusion of ⟨God's⟩ immediate power, this is an error and a dangerous view.*¹⁰

As this suggests, by the time of the first list of errors concerning Durand it was clear that Durand's position was not entirely orthodox, and the same remark appears in the later list of errors as well.¹¹

Indeed, the most common position to take with regard to God's concurrence was to accept both that secondary agents are causally active and that God is immediately active in every operation of nature. How these claims are reconciled will be the main focus of Giles's, Aquinas's, and Peter's texts.

God's Uniform Action: Giles of Rome

Although Giles and Aquinas agree that God concurs with created causes in every operation of nature, how they understand this concurrence differ in important respects.¹² Since Peter of Palude (contrary to Durand) treats Giles's account first, I will also proceed in this order.

10. Josef Koch, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 2 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1973), 57: “[17] Secundo libro d. prima a. 4 in suo antiquo innuit et probat quod deus non agit immediate in actione omnis creature; sed hoc non invenimus in suo secundo novo. Ibidem eciam in fine articuli dicit quod dubium est an ‘oporteat deum immediate coexistere omni creature quantum ad omnia que sunt in ea quod forte’, ut dicit, ‘non est verum sed solum quoad illa que sunt immediate ab ipso’; et iste articulus est solum in suo veteri non in novo. *Si intendat exclusionem immediate* [in Koch: immediatam] *virtutis, error et periculosum.*” The final quotation is from *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lines 231–234; see also below, lines 138–141. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Latin are mine.

11. §52; Koch, *ibid.*, 83. In fact, the Parisian condemnation of 1277 already labeled such a position as erroneous (prop. 190 [16]): “Quod prima causa est causa entium remotissima. — Error, si intelligatur cum precisione, scilicet ita: quod non propinquissima.” (Étienne Tempier, *La condamnation Parisienne de 1277*, ed. David Piché and Claude Lafleur (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 136.)

12. Although Giles was for a long time regarded as no more than a faithful and rather servant follower Aquinas, new studies show this to be not the case. On Giles's “anti-thomism” in general, see Martin Pickavé, “An Early Witness of the Reportatio of Giles of Rome's Lectures on the Sentences: Note on the Edition of Concetta Luna,” *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 71, no. 1 (May 2005): 175–185. For Giles's and Aquinas's comparative treatment of creation, see Giorgio

Giles’s fullest treatment of the question how God interacts with secondary agents can be found in his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (1286–87) and in the parallel questions of his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences* — both in the revised *Ordinatio* version (finished around 1309) and in the *Reportatio* (around 1271–73).¹³ After clarifying the sense of ‘immediate’ — which, depending on whether we consider it from the effect or from the cause, can either mean a proximate cause, a principal cause, or both¹⁴ — he maintains that God is the immediate cause of natural effects in both of these senses.

Since Peter of Palude’s presentation of Giles’s view is almost verbatim a repetition of Durand’s characterization of it (more on this in the next section), it is likely that Peter’s source, at least in this text, was not Giles himself but rather Durand’s *Sentences* commentary. Regarding the source of Durand, a comparison of Durand’s text with that of the *Reportatio* and the other works mentioned above clearly shows that Durand relied on Giles’s *Reportatio* when discussing the question. (In fact, Durand’s description of Giles’s view is hardly more than a paraphrase of the *Reportatio* passage.) Although this might seem somewhat surprising — after all, Giles’s revised, *Ordinatio* version of *Sentences* II and his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* were much more widely circulated than his unrevised *Reportatio* — Durand could not have used the *Ordinatio* version, since Durand’s first redaction (between 1304 and 1308) was finished earlier than Giles’s revision. Why Durand did not use (if he knew) the *Quaestiones* is not clear at the moment, but at least from this and from John of Paris’s mention of the *Reportatio*¹⁵ it seems likely that the Dominicans in

Pini, “Being and Creation in Giles of Rome,” in *After the Condemnation of 1277*, ed. Jan A Aertsen, Kent Emery, and Andreas Speer (Berlin, 2001), 390–409; or, with respect to sacramental causality, Marilyn McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist*, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Giles’s concurrentism is explored in some detail in Placidus Vollmer, “Die göttliche Mitwirkung bei Aegidius Romanus,” *Divus Thomas* 6 (1928): 452–470, who, however, did not yet have access to the *Reportatio* or to the *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*.

13. *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q.4; *In II Sent.*, d.1, pars 1, q.2, a.6; *Reportatio* II, q.8. See also his commentary on the *Liber de causis* (1287–90), prop.4. For the chronology of Giles’s works, see Francesco Del Punta, Silvia Donati, and Concetta Luna, “Egidio Romano,” in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, ed. Alberto Maria Ghisalberti, vol. 42 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993), 319–341.

14. Cf. *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q.4, 9rb. According to Giles’s example there, if we consider it from the cause, then, for instance, the king is a more immediate cause of whatever the legate as a legate does, since the legate is acting by the king’s power (that is, by the mediation of the king). On the other hand, if we consider it from the effect, then the legate is a more immediate cause than the king, since it is closer to the effect than the king is.

15. Cf. Concetta Luna’s introduction in Aegidius Romanus, *Reportatio Lecturae Super Libros I–IV Sententiarum*, ed. Concetta Luna, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia (Florence: Edizioni del Galluzzo,

Paris around the first decade of the fourteenth century did have a copy of or at least access to this work.

The *Reportatio* passage that Durand and in turn Peter of Palude refer to, is from question 8 of the second book, where regarding the mode of divine concurrence, Giles notes:

An effect that is from God alone, is [from God] immediately and totally; but an effect that is from God by the mediation of secondary causes, is from God wholly immediately but not totally, that is, not in every way, because God uniformly acts in everything as much as it depends on him, so that the diversity [of things] is only due to the diversity of recipients, which cannot receive uniformly, because they receive according to their natures; and thus the effect, insofar as it is from the influence of God, does not have any distinction, but it has distinction from the part that is from the secondary causes (acting diversely according to their diverse natures) and according to the diversity of those receiving God's influence.¹⁶

According to this account, in cases of natural causation, God is responsible for the effect wholly immediately but not totally. Giles illustrates this distinction with an example: In a living being, to exist is the same as to live, or, a human person is a human just as much as he is an animal (that is, there is no part of the human person that would not be, at the same time, also part of the animal). However, if we just look at living things insofar as they exist, this does not distinguish them from non-living things; or similarly, if we just look at human beings insofar as they are animals, this does not distinguish them from other kinds of animals.¹⁷ Now, according to

2003), 3–4.

16. *Reportatio monacensis*, q.8 (Aegidius Romanus, *Reportatio*, 208, lines 19–28): “Effectus qui est a solo Deo, ⟨est⟩ totus immediate et totaliter; sed effectus qui est a Deo mediantibus causis secundis, est a Deo totus immediate, sed non totaliter, id est non omni modo, quia Deus uniformiter agit in omnibus quantum est ex parte sui, ita quod solum diversitas est propter diversitatem recipientium, qui non possunt recipere uniformiter, quia [non] recipiunt secundum naturas suas; et ita effectus, a parte illa qua est ex influentia Dei, non habet distinctionem, sed ex parte illa qua est ex causis secundis agentibus diversimode propter diversas naturas earum et propter diversitatem recipientis influentiae Dei, habet distinctionem.” See also Aegidius Romanus, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia, de mensura angelorum et de cognitione angelorum*. (Venice: Per Simonem de Luere, 1513), q.4 (fol. 9rb) (hereafter cited as QDEE); and Aegidius Romanus, *Super librum de causis* (Venice: Apud Iacobum Zoppinum (repr.: Minerva), 1550 (1968)), q.4 (fol. 14v H).

17. *Ibid.*, lines 28–35: “In effectu vivente idem est penitus vivere et esse, et ideo totum est a Deo et totum est a secundo agente, quia totum quod dicit vivere, dicit esse, sicut idem dicunt homo et animal: nam omni modo quod dicit illud ‘homo’ dicit illud ‘animal’. Ita Deus agit totum, sed non totaliter.”

Giles, God is responsible for the universal part (the *esse*) of every being, from which there is no distinction between things; and the secondary agent is responsible for what makes the thing distinct from others. In this sense, we can say that God is not totally responsible for the thing's existence (since he is not responsible for its diversity) even though he is wholly immediately responsible for it.¹⁸

Giles make the same point elsewhere relying on Dionysius's characterization of God's influence in the *Divine Names*.¹⁹ As Giles claims, the uniformity of God's action and the resulting diversity is similar to how the uniform action of the sun results in different colors: although the sun gives the same light to everything, the objects reflect this uniform sunlight in different ways due to their different natures (or the dispositions of the various surfaces); similarly, God gives the same *esse* to every created thing, while the diversity of effects derive from the different ways in which the secondary agents reflect it due to their different natures and different dispositions.²⁰ The result of God's action is thus the *esse* of things that is differentiated by their secondary causes; moreover, since everything is primarily an existing thing and only after that a thing of a certain kind or of a certain quality, Giles also concludes that God is a more principal cause than the secondary agent.

Giles further elaborates on this latter point with the help of the sun analogy in his commentary on the *Liber de causis*.²¹ As he notes here, just as light is the first visible, because it is what primarily provides the *ratio* of visibility for other things (simply: it is only by light that we see other things), in a similar way, *esse* is the first among created things, because this is what provides the *ratio* for other things being

18. Although Giles makes no reference to it in this context, this way he might still be able to maintain that *forma dat esse rei* (*Auct. Arist.* 1, 189; 1, 201; and 1, 214): God gives *esse* insofar as it is considered in its uniformity, but the secondary agent, by virtue of its substantial form, gives it insofar as it is considered in its specificity.

19. For Dionysius, see *De divinis nominibus*, 146, col. 4 (Grosseteste tr.): “Etenim quemadmodum qui secundum nos sol, non ratiocinans aut eligens sed ipso esse, illuminat omnia participare lumen ipsius, secundum propriam potentia rationem, sic utique et per se bonum, super solem ut super obscuram imaginem segregate archetypum, ipsa existentia omnibus existentibus analogice supermittit totius bonitatis radios” (Dionysius Areopagita (Pseudo-), *Dionysiaca: Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, ed. Ph. Chevallier (1937–1951)).

20. *Ordinatio* II, d.1, p.1, q.2, a.6 (Aegidius Romanus, *In Secundum Librum Sententiarum Quaestiones (Ordinatio)* (Venice: Apud Franciscum Zilettum, 1581), 31b C).

21. Prop. 4: “Prima rerum creatarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud.” Aquinas's interpretation of this analogy in the same place is somewhat similar, although he thinks that unless one assumes that the first created thing is already diverse, it is impossible to give a satisfactory account of the multiplicity of created things. For his commentary, see Thomas Aquinas, *Super librum de causis expositio*, ed. H D Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002).

created (simply: it is only because they participate in *esse* that they are produced).²² He goes on to explain how the multiplicity of created things comes about by another analogy that Durand and in turn Peter will mention, although in a slightly different context. Giles compares the process of multiplication of *esse* to the coming about of numbers from the number one; just as in the number case, when one is multiplied to three by the mediation of two, and so on, here also all multiplication comes about by the mediation of the intelligences (which are already multiple). The intelligences themselves are multiplied because the one infinite *esse* is joined with something finite (namely, their form or essence).

Although there are much more to Giles's account than what this limited study can show, this will already suffice to make Durand's and Peter's objections intelligible. For Durand presents two arguments against Giles's account, and these arguments are almost verbatim repeated by Peter. First he argues against the position itself, then against the argument for the position. Concerning the first one he notes:

This opinion is mistaken in itself and in its reasoning. For what it says, that God acts uniformly in everything and there is no diversity in things if not from the secondary causes, is false, because according to this it would be impossible that multiple things come into existence from God without secondary causes, and thus God could not create diverse things, which is false.²³

Thus, according to Durand, if we assume that God acts uniformly in every operation of nature, this would imply that he cannot create multiple, numerically distinct and different things (if we take 'creation' to mean bringing them about without secondary causes). However, since we do know that God can (and did) create multiple numerically distinct things, as Giles would also admit, then we have to deny the antecedent.²⁴

Second, Durand notes that Giles's argument is mistaken:

22. Fol. 13v C: "Hoc ergo modo prima rerum creatarum est esse, sicut prima rerum visarum est lux, quia lux est prima et principalis ratio quare aliquid videatur. Lux enim respersa[?] in rebus facit ea esse visibilia. Sic ex esse sumitur prima et principalis ratio quare aliquid creetur, quia intantum aliquid est cratum et productum inquantum participat esse."

23. *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lines 114–122: "Hec autem opinio defficit in se et in sua ratione. Quod enim dicit, quod Deus uniformiter agit in omnibus nec est diuersitas in rebus nisi ex causis secundis, falsum est, quia secundum hoc impossibile esset quod plura et distincta fierent a Deo sine causis secundis, et ita Deus non posset diuersa creare, quod est falsum." For Peter of Palude, see lines 29–32.

24. Giles addresses how one can account for creation of individuals even by this uniform action in his *De causis* commentary, prop. 24.

Also, the argument by which they prove their opinion is not sound. For what they assume, namely that the particular effect is reduced to the particular cause and the universal effect to the universal cause, should be understood about the particular and universal according to the mode of predication, similarly in the cause and in the effect.²⁵

According to Durand, Giles's argument — *esse* being the most general effect, hence the effect of the most general cause, God — is mistaken, since from an effect that is most universal only according to reason it wants to derive a cause that is most universal not only according to reason but also in reality. Durand cites Aristotle's example about *this* sculptor being the cause of *this* statue while sculptor (in general) being the cause of statues (in general), in which case *this* statue and statue (in general) differ only according to reason, and similarly in the cause. In the same way, from *esse* being the most general effect according to reason one could indeed derive the claim that God (the cause of this *esse*) is the most general cause according to reason; Giles, however, wants to maintain that God is also the most general cause in reality as well, which claim thus remains unsupported.

Indeterminate and Determinate Esse: Aquinas

Whether Durand's or Peter of Palude's reading of Aquinas gives a correct interpretation of Aquinas's final take on divine concurrence is at least dubious as their main source is his *Sentences* commentary rather than the more developed *Summae* or the *Quaestiones de potentia*.²⁶ (It is worth noting, however, that it is the same

25. *Ibid.*, lines 129–133: “Ratio etiam per quam probant suum propositum non ualet. Quod enim assumunt quod effectus particularis reducitur in causam particularem et uniuersalis in uniuersalem intelligendum est de particulari et uniuersali per predicationem, consimiliter in causa et effectum.” For Peter, see lines 40–43.

26. Aquinas's account of divine concurrence has received little attention in recent scholarship. For various aspects of it, see Jan A Aertsen, *Nature and Creature: Aquinas's Way of Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 127–136 and 313–324 (on how it connects to Aquinas's more general metaphysical background); Petr Dvořák, “The Concurrentism of Thomas Aquinas: Divine Causation and Human Freedom,” *Philosophia* 41, no. 3 (August 2013): 617–634 (about concurrence and human agency); Stephen L Brock, “Causality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas,” *Quaestio* 2 (2002): 217–240 (concerning the problem of causal necessitation in Aquinas); Michael Dodds, “Unlocking Divine Causality: Aquinas, Contemporary Science, and Divine Action,” *Angelicum* 86 (2009): 67–86; Gregory T Doolan, “The Causality of the Divine Ideas in Relation to Natural Agents in Thomas Aquinas,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 44, no. 3 (September 2004): 393–409; Alfred J Freddoso, “God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (1994): 131–156; Michael Rota, “Causation,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 104–114;

Sentences account as the one that also Giles criticizes in his *Reportatio* just before developing his own answer.) The account they discuss comes from book II, d.1, q.1, a.4, where Aquinas, after quickly dealing with occasionalism and mere conservationism, presents a third, concurrentist option. According to this third option, things fall into two categories with respect to how they come to be. First, there are things that are created by God immediately and cannot be produced by a creature (which can be for various reasons). Second, there are things that can be and are produced by other created things, and these are the relevant ones for the current discussion. About these, Aquinas notes:

The third position is that God effects everything immediately, and that particular things have proper operations by which they are the proximate causes of things. . . . Others, however, that are produced by motion and generation, can have a created cause, either so that [the created cause] has causality above the whole species, just as the sun is a cause in the generation of humans or of lions; or so that it has causality only with respect to a member of a certain species, just as man generates man, and fire generates fire. God, however, is also a cause of these, more intimately working in them than the other moving causes: because he is giving the *esse* of things, while the other causes are determining this *esse*. For there is no such thing the whole being of which receives its principle from some creature, since matter is only from God; but the *esse* is more intimate to the thing than that by which it is determined (since it remains when the others are removed, as it is said in the *Liber de causis*). Therefore, the operation of the creator pertains to the thing more intimately than the operation of the secondary cause, and thus that the creature is the cause of other creatures does not exclude that God immediately operates in everything.²⁷

and Ignacio Silva, “Thomas Aquinas Holds Fast: Objections to Aquinas within Today’s Debate on Divine Action,” *The Heythrop Journal* 54, no. 4 (2013): 658–667. Among these, Dvořák is the only one who gives considerable attention to Aquinas’s treatment in the *Quaestiones de potentia*.

27. *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.1, a.4, co.: “Tertia positio est, quod Deus immediate omnia operatur, et quod res singulae proprias operationes habent, per quas causae proximae rerum sunt. . . . Aliorum vero quae per motum et generationem producuntur, creatura causa esse potest, vel ita quod habeat causalitatem supra totam speciem, sicut sol est causa in generatione hominis vel leonis; vel ita quod habeat causalitatem ad unum individuum speciei tantum, sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Horum tamen causa etiam Deus est, magis intime in eis operans quam aliae causae moventes: quia ipse est dans esse rebus. Causae autem aliae sunt quasi determinantes illud esse. Nullius enim rei totum esse ab aliqua creatura principium sumit, cum materia a Deo solum sit; esse autem est magis intimum cuilibet rei quam ea per quae esse determinatur; unde et remanet, illis

The account proposed here consists of two claims: (1) in the case of every being, God is responsible for its *esse*, while the secondary cause somehow determines this *esse* and is thus responsible for the determinate qualities the thing has; and (2) since the former is more intimate to the thing than the latter, God is a more intimate cause of the secondary effect than the secondary agent.²⁸ Aquinas here leaves the notions of indeterminate and determinate *esse* largely unexplained, but according to his argument, God is responsible for the indeterminate *esse* because he is responsible for the matter of every created thing, while the secondary agent induces the form in that matter.²⁹ As this suggests, Aquinas maintains that the division of labor between God and the secondary cause in a natural causal action reflects the metaphysical division between matter and form in the effect.³⁰

Peter of Palude will further elaborate on the position, maintaining both of its claims, and making Aquinas's argument relying on the matter and form distinction more explicit. According to Peter's description, matter contributes to the thing's existence, or more precisely, it gives the thing its being in general. Form, on the other hand, presupposing this matter and being, is responsible for the determination of it, which makes the thing to be the kind of thing it is (in case of a substantial form), or makes the thing to have the specific quality it has (in case of an accidental form).

As for the second claim, that God's action is more immediate or interior to the effect than that of the secondary agent, Peter, borrowing again Durand's description of the position,³¹ appeals to a specific notion of interiority, having to do with "removing": according to this notion, C_1 is more immediately inherent to E than C_2

remotis, ut in libro de causis dicitur. Unde operatio creatoris magis pertingit ad intima rei quam operatio causarum secundarum: et ideo hoc quod creatum est causa alii creaturae, non excludit quin Deus immediate in rebus omnibus operetur."

28. For a more detailed analysis of this passage, especially with regard to God's action on the secondary agent and the account's neoplatonic origins, see Jacob Schmutz, "La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure," *Revue thomiste* 101 (2001): 217–264, especially 223–229.

29. It is important to emphasize that for Aquinas, the secondary agent *induces* but does not *create* the form; the latter is also a result of God's activity.

30. Interestingly, later in his career Aquinas does not seem to regard this characterization as a sufficient one of divine concurrence. Indeed, as Durand will be ready to point it out, saying this much only seems to amount to some kind of partialism (a view that not the whole effect but only part of it is brought about by God, which Aquinas would elsewhere deny — see, e.g., *Summa contra gentiles* III, c.70).

31. *In II Sent.*, 49, lin. 33–44.

just in case we can remove C_2 while C_1 still remains — but not vice versa.³² And, according to Peter, the secondary cause in every action is such that its effect (the determinate *esse*) can be removed from the thing while God’s effect (the indeterminate *esse*) cannot. To put it otherwise, God’s contribution does not get removed by removing the secondary cause’s contribution, while if we remove God’s contribution, the secondary cause’s contribution is also removed with it.

According to Durand, however, Aquinas’s account is mistaken for two reasons: first, it is irrelevant to the question; second, one claim of the account rests on a false assumption. As he notes, in this case cited by Peter verbatim:

That it is not to the point is clear, because it is one thing to say that God produces immediately something that is in a creature, namely matter, which is one part of the composite substance, which is entirely true, yet not to the point; and another thing to say that God produces immediately everything that is produced by the creature. For since the action of the creature attains a form but not matter as the term of its action, as they say, we ask whether that form of the natural thing, which is attained immediately by the action of the creature, is also attained immediately by the action of God. They, however, treat the first point but not the second, which is clear from the middle term of the argument they adduce, and thus it is not to the point.³³

Thus, Durand raises against Aquinas what we might call the ‘partialism objection’: if one understands Aquinas as claiming that *whatever* the creature brings about, God also immediately brings about, then he cannot say that one part of the effect is brought about by God and the other part is brought about by the creature, since in this latter action God’s immediate cooperation is not posited, despite the

32. Cf. below, lines 281–290. Although in Palude’s formulation it is C_1 itself that remains after C_2 ’s removal, the *De Causis* passage Palude is referring to makes the claim that it is C_1 ’s power and activity that remain after C_2 ’s power and activity are taken away. See *Liber de causis*, prop. 1, 1–2.

33. *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lines 47–57: “Quod non sit ad propositum, patet, quia aliud est dicere quod Deus producat immediate aliquid quod est in creatura, scilicet materiam, que est altera pars substantie composite, quod utique uerum est nec hoc querit questio; aliud est dicere quod Deus producat immediate omne illud quod producit creatura. Cum enim actio creature attingat formam ut terminum actionis sue et non materiam, ut ipsimet dicunt, querimus utrum ipsam formam rei naturalis, ad quam immediate attingit actio creature, attingat etiam actio Dei immediate. Ipsi autem pertractant primum et non secundum, ut patet ex medio quod adducunt, et ideo non est ad propositum.” For Peter, see lines 293–300.

earlier claim to the contrary.³⁴ Aquinas seems to maintain, however, that matter is brought about by God, and form is by the secondary agent. Therefore, Durand claims, this version of the concurrentist position cannot be consistently maintained.

Durand's second argument is directed against the argument for the claim that God's concurring action is more immediate to the effect than that of the secondary agent. In Durand's interpretation, the argument rests on two premises: that (P_1) indeterminate *esse* is more immediate or more interior to the thing than its determinate *esse*; and that (P_2) God is responsible for the former while the secondary cause is responsible for the latter. According to Durand, however, the first premise of this argument is simply false:

It also assumes something false. For what they say that *esse* is more intimate to a thing than those ⟨features⟩ that determine it, if it is understood so that *esse* in potency is more intimate to the thing than *esse* in act by which it is determined, then it is false. For just as something is more truly what it is by the form rather than by the matter... , in the same way *esse* in act is more true and more intimate to the thing than *esse* in potency. If, however, it is understood so that actual *esse*, as taken in its generality, is more intimate to the thing than that by which it is determined to this or that being, which is living being or intellectual being, then they change the meaning of their claim, as it is obvious by itself.³⁵

As this passage suggests, the argument is mistaken, since

1. (P_1) can either mean that (a) *esse* in potency is more intimate to a thing than its *esse* in act; or that (b) *esse*, taken generally, is more intimate than that which determines it.
2. But (a) is false.
3. Hence (b).

34. This is the very same argument that Giles had already leveled against Aquinas's early position; cf. *Reportatio*, 207–208.

35. *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lines 58–67: “Assumit etiam falsum. Quod enim dicunt quod esse est intimius rei quam ea que ipsum determinant, si intelligatur quod esse in potentia sit intimius rei quam esse in actu per quod determinatur, falsum est. Sicut enim per formam quelibet res est uerius id quod est quam per materiam... sic esse actu est uerius et intimius rei quam esse in potentia. Si autem intelligatur quod esse actuale in sua communitate sumptum intimius est rei quam ea per que determinatur ad hoc esse uel illud quod est esse uiuens uel esse intellectuale, tunc uariant propositum suum, ut de se patet.” For Peter, see lines 301–308.

4. But (b) modifies the proposition P_1 , and thus C does not follow.

The first horn of Durand's dilemma here attributes to Aquinas the claim that *esse* in potency is more immediate to a thing than its *esse* in act. However, in an Aristotelian framework, as Durand points out, this is not the case; *esse* in potentiality is determined by the substantial form, which makes the thing the thing it is (e.g., making the indeterminate *esse* of animality into that of a human being); and thus the latter is much more immediate to the thing than the former.

The second horn of the dilemma is more difficult to interpret, especially since its *reductio* is assumed to be simply "obvious by itself." It attributes to Aquinas the claim that "actual *esse*, as taken in its generality, is more interior to the thing than that by which it is determined to this or that being, which is living being or intellectual being," and argues that if this is the case, then Aquinas modifies the meaning of P_1 . From the rather brief elaboration that Durand offers here, the point seems to be similar to the one raised against Giles. The argument only works if P_1 is understood as saying that indeterminate and determinate *esse* is more and less immediate in reality (*in re*), since only in this case can we maintain that their respective causes (namely, God and the secondary agent) are more and less immediate in reality, and since God is regarded as a universal cause not merely *secundum rationem* but really. As Durand has argued, however, the reading of P_1 according to which it expresses a real distinction is not plausible; indeed, the premise can only be regarded true if it marks a distinction according to reason (*secundum rationem*), namely that indeterminate *esse*, taken generally (*communitate sumptum*) is more immediate than determinate *esse*.

I cannot discuss here whether Durand's criticism of Aquinas is in fact right. In the text below Peter offers a response to Durand's objection, and argues that Aquinas's account, if we understand it properly, can be defended against this criticism.

Peter of Palude's Position

Peter of Palude responds to Durand's objections against Aquinas by elaborating on what it means to be responsible for the existence of matter, and then by endorsing the first horn of Durand's dilemma. Peter emphasizes that matter needs to be maintained at every moment of its existence, which grounds the immediacy of God's concurring action. His example does not fully express this, but as he says, we can imagine that two people apply a seal so that one warms up and applies the wax, while the other presses the seal itself into the wax. In this case, as Peter points out, we would be likely to say that the one who applied the wax acted just as immediately to the impression of the seal as the one who pressed the seal into it. In a similar

way, God, by producing the matter and appropriately disposing it to receive the form from the secondary agent, acts just as immediately towards every effect as the secondary agent does.³⁶

As for Durand's dilemma, Peter maintains that if we understand correctly, *esse* in potentia *is* prior and more immediate to the thing than its actual *esse*; as was pointed out above, he argues that the former comes prior to the thing as the latter and recedes from the thing later than the latter. That is, we might say at one moment (namely when the cat has not been born yet) that the existence of a certain cat is merely possible; and can also say (after the cat died) that its existence is possible (since it did not die at that time necessarily). If this is the case, then possible being does precede actual being, and the two are different in reality and not only *secundum rationem*: actual being can be taken away while possible being remains, just as it is required by the notion of 'immediate' Peter is referring to.³⁷

After answering Durand's objections against Aquinas, Peter proposes his own answer, which he regards as an elaboration on Aquinas's account, and which does indeed agree with what Aquinas has said on the question. Similarly to Aquinas, Peter maintains that (1) God conserves everything in being; (2) God immediately acts in every action of a creature; and (3) God acts with an action that is formally but not materially distinct from the action of the creature.³⁸ He presents some arguments for each of these claims, which I will cite here without thorough examination.

In the argument for the first,³⁹ Peter refers to the distinction between ingenerable (eviternal) and generable things, and shows that the claim is true of both. Although the argument in the case of ingenerable things is not much more than a restatement of the claim (God conserves them in being since he is the cause of their existence), in the case of generable things he offers two arguments. First, since (according to the previous remark) the ingenerable heavens cannot even conserve themselves in existence, they can even less conserve something else, unless they are supported by God's immediate action. According to the second argument, it is within God's power to annihilate every content while retaining all containing things with their powers; but this could not be unless by the withdrawal of a concurring action. (The minor premise follows from the fact that a positive action must have either a terminus or a subject in which the change occurs, both of which is lacking in annihilation.)

As an elaboration on the second claim⁴⁰ — that God acts immediately in every

36. Cf. lines 332–338.

37. Cf. lines 361–363.

38. Cf. lines 360–363.

39. Cf. lines 364–375.

40. Cf. lines 376–383.

action — Peter, just as Aquinas at least in his later account, maintains that God’s action is immediate both on the secondary agent and on the secondary effect. On the secondary effect it is immediate since God has to conserve and thus create the secondary effect at every moment of its existence (including the moment of its generation). It is likewise immediate on the secondary agent, since an agent is more capable of maintaining itself in existence than of bringing to existence something else, but as was just shown above, no secondary agent can maintain itself; therefore, no secondary agent can bring something else into existence either without God supplementing its power.⁴¹

Finally, for the third claim⁴² — that God’s action is formally distinct but materially identical to the action of the secondary agent — Peter notes that the distinction between actions *ex principiis* comes from their efficient cause, while the distinction *ex terminis* from their final cause. Thus, when — in the often used example — two people are pulling a boat on a river, or two candles illuminate a room, we can speak of only one action formally, since the two agents act by the same principle of action (that is, they pull the boat by the same power, and similarly for the candles). In the case of God and the secondary creature, however, the action must be formally distinct, since they do not have the same principle of action (or, as Aquinas would say, they belong to a different order of causes), even though their termini are the same.

As can be seen already from this brief exposition, Peter of Palude’s approach can hardly be called novel. Nevertheless, the main virtue of his text lies in the fact that he at least seems familiar with several of the contemporary competing positions — even if this familiarity derives primarily not from his reading of primary sources but from a close acquaintance with Durand of St.-Pourçain’s commentary — and reacts to each of them from a broadly speaking Thomistic concurrentist viewpoint.

2. Peter of Palude and Durand of St.-Pourçain

Peter was first noticed in the twentieth century precisely because of his connection to Durand of St.-Pourçain, another Dominican theologian in Paris in the 1300s whose teachings resulted in two investigations to determine their orthodoxy. Involved in these investigations — taking place in Paris in 1314 and 1316/17 — were Peter of Palude, Hervaeus Natalis, James of Lausanne, and John of Naples. The first investigation issued a list of 93 propositions that were suspected of error or heresy.⁴³

41. Aquinas’s similar argument is somewhat more detailed in *De potentia*, q.3, a.7.

42. Cf. below, lines 384–404.

43. For the edition of this list, see Koch, *Kleine Schriften*, 53–72.

The second investigation took a more directly Thomistic line, examining how much Durand disagreed with Thomas, and issuing a list of 235 propositions.

Durand, during his lifetime, produced multiple redactions of his commentary on the *Sentences*, and the relationship between or in fact the number of these different redactions is not entirely clear at the moment. Koch had argued that Durand had three different versions; one was published in 1307/08 (redaction *A*), the second was composed between 1310–13 (redaction *B*), and the third later, between 1317 and 1327 (redaction *C*).⁴⁴ Of book II, both early redactions are known, while for book I, only one version is extant (together with redaction *C*). Although recent work on Durand has shown that the picture is more complicated than Koch had assumed,⁴⁵ we need not take a stance on those issues for now. What is worth repeating is that, as noted above, Durand’s *B* redaction does not contain the question on divine concurrence, while it reappears in redaction *C* in almost verbatim the same way as it was presented in *A*.

Durand’s career and commentary is relevant in the present context due to the fact that Peter of Palude incorporated much of Durand’s text into his own.⁴⁶ Which one of Durand’s three redactions was Peter using is generally difficult to determine (redaction *C* was almost certainly composed after Peter’s text, thus the choice is rather between *A* and *B*),⁴⁷ even though until recently it was regarded as relatively well established that he could not have used the *B* version in book II.⁴⁸ Whether this

44. Josef Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.*, Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorfschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927).

45. For instance, Fiorella Retucci has recently argued that Durand’s redactions might have been the result of a continuous revising process, producing manuscripts that contain multiple redactions at the same time. (Fiorella Retucci, “Selected Problems in Books I-II of Durand’s *Sentences Commentary*,” in *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences Commentary: Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues*, ed. Andreas Speer et al. [Leuven: Peeters, 2014], 71–96) . I would like to thank Thomas Jeschke and Massimo Perrone at the Cologne Institute for informing me about the current *status quaestionis*, and providing some useful background on Durand’s work. The present text also confirms that there is another, no longer extant redaction of book I; Peter makes a reference to book I to a question (d. 17 q. 7) that is missing from the extant redaction although is present in *C* (which Peter could not have used due to its lateness) cf. line 214 below.

46. The claim that Durand’s lost version of the first book (if there was one) is virtually contained in Peter’s commentary, was first defended in Koch, *Durandus*. For the accuracy of this claim, as well as for the best recent study on Peter’s connection to Durand, see Russell L Friedman, Chris Schabel, and Irene Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents,” *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001): 183–300.

47. According to Koch, it was the *A* version in all cases; but now it has been established that this cannot be the case. For a comprehensive study on the question see Friedman, *ibid.*, 198–215.

48. See Durand of St.-Pourçain, *Durandi de S. Porciano, OP: Quaestio de natura cognitionis (II Sent. [A] d. 3 q. 5) et Disputatio cum Anonymo quodam*, ed. Josef Koch (Münster: Aschendorff,

is indeed the case in general — Friedman et al. have concluded that “the only safe method of proceeding when trying to make claims about which version of Durand’s commentary Peter was relying on is to compare Peter’s text with Durand’s version *A*, *B*, or both”⁴⁹ — making the claim regarding the present text is easy as the corresponding question is missing from the *B* version, thus, Peter could have only been using version *A*.⁵⁰ Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, all Durand references will be to redaction *A*.

Peter of Palude’s connection to Durand helps to give an approximate date for Peter’s *Sentences* commentary.⁵¹ As has been well established,⁵² Durand’s first redaction of the *Sentences* was written somewhere between 1304 and 1308. We also know that Peter probably lectured on the *Sentences* in 1310–12, after which he was regent master in theology in Paris (1314–17). His commentary — almost certainly an *Ordinatio* — was composed in this order: book I, book III, book II, and book IV.⁵³ We do know that he finished book III by November 1312, so he probably started on book II towards the end of that year. He finished the final, fourth book by 1315 or perhaps even later.⁵⁴ Thus, we can quite safely say that he was working on book II somewhere between the end of 1312 and 1314.

Returning to Durand’s influence on Peter of Palude, in the text below, 168 out of the total 405 lines come from Durand almost verbatim. Although this might seem to render Peter’s work rather unoriginal, this is not entirely the case, since even

1929); Raymond Marie Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIVe siècle: Textes inédits* (Leuven: Bureaux, 1930); Mark G Henninger, “Durand of Saint Pourçain (B. CA. 1270; D. 1334),” in *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150-1650)*, ed. Jorge J E Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 319–32; and Friedman, Schabel, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude.”

49. *Ibid.*, 215.

50. Or, as Fiorella Retucci has concluded, a manuscript that contained both versions.

51. This relies on Giuseppe Groppo, *La Teologia e il suo "Subiectum" secondo il prologo del commento alle sentenze di Pietro da Palude, O.P. (+1342)* (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Salesianum, 1961) and Friedman, Schabel, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude,” 214–215; see also Prospero Tommaso Stella, “A proposito di Pietro da Palude (In I Sent., d.43, q.1): La questione inedita ‘Utrum Deum esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari’ di Erveo Natalis,” *Salesianum* 22 (1960): 245–325.

52. Cf. Friedman, Schabel, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude,” 189–190; both the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* relies on Hervaeus’s works, for which see Bruno Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Westfalen, 1967).

53. Friedman, Schabel, and Balcoyiannopoulou, “Peter of Palude,” 214. See also Dunbabin, *A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-century Church*.

54. Valens Heynck, “Zur Datierung des Sentenzenkommentars des Petrus de Palude,” *Franziskanische Studien* 53 (1971): 317–27.

where he uses Durand's text, how he does it betrays some philosophical insight. His arrangement of the text largely differs from his opponent's, and so does, of course, his main argument and conclusion. The table below shows the thematic breakdown of Durand's and Peter's text. The first part is practically a table of contents to Fiorella Retucci's recent Durand edition,⁵⁵ with its line numbers, referencing also where Peter repeats the text (with the line numbers of the present edition). These repetitions do contain occasional minor differences (*ergo* for *igitur* and other synonyms), which I have not noted. The second part of the table lists the topics in the order Peter treats them, giving the line numbers of the present edition, and also the references to Durand's text (with the line numbers of Retucci's edition).

As this list shows, Peter of Palude makes extensive use of Durand's text while completely restructuring it. Peter presents four positions on the question (while Durand only dealt with three). First, he starts with Giles of Rome's position (which was the second position Durand discussed), where he basically agrees with Durand's exposition and criticism. Second, he presents Durand's position quite carefully, with all the arguments that can be found in Durand's text, raising and answering also the objections that Durand discussed. One of the most original pieces in Peter's work is his argument against Durand's position, where he shows that it contradicts Biblical authority and the arguments offered for it are insufficient to establish the conclusion. Third, while Durand deals with Aquinas's position first and rather quickly, Peter discusses it as the penultimate opinion with which — after certain clarifications — he will mostly agree. He repeats both Durand's exposition of and arguments against Aquinas, and responds to the latter in detail. Finally, fourth, he presents his own view on the question, relatively briefly, given that he regards it as a clarification of Aquinas's view.

As was pointed out above and can also be seen from these remarks, both Durand and Peter join into an ongoing discussion on divine concurrence, relying on Aquinas's and Giles's position, besides whom they also cite Aristotle, Avicenna (Peter), and some authors whom I have not been able to identify.

55. Durand of St.-Pourçain, *Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: distinctiones 1–5 libri secundi*, ed. Fiorella Retucci (Leuven: Peeters, 2012).

Durand's <i>In II Sent.</i>, d.1, q.4		<i>Palude</i>
Objections to Durand's position	lin. 3–15	<i>lin. 123–132</i>
Sed contra	lin. 16–18	—
Clarification of the question	lin. 19–31	—
Aquinas's position	lin. 32–44	<i>lin. 281–290</i>
Against Aquinas's position	lin. 45–82	<i>lin. 291–319</i>
Giles of Rome's position	lin. 83–103	<i>lin. 6–28</i>
Against Giles's position	lin. 104–147	<i>lin. 29–54</i>
Durand's position	lin. 148–214	<i>lin. 69–122</i>
Response to the objections	lin. 215–235	<i>lin. 134–149</i>
Palude's <i>In II Sent.</i>, d.1, q.4		<i>Durand</i>
Objection from Biblical authority	lin. 2	—
Sed contra from Biblical authority	lin. 3	—
Giles of Rome's position	lin. 6–28	<i>lin. 83–103</i>
Against Giles's position	lin. 29–54	<i>lin. 104–147</i>
Further remarks on Giles's position	lin. 55–68	—
Durand's position	lin. 69–122	<i>lin. 148–214</i>
Objections to Durand's position	lin. 123–132	<i>lin. 3–15</i>
Durand's response to the objections	lin. 134–149	<i>lin. 215–235</i>
Against Durand's position	lin. 150–280	—
Aquinas's position	lin. 281–290	<i>lin. 32–44</i>
Durand's objections to Aquinas	lin. 291–319	<i>lin. 45–82</i>
Further remarks on Durand's objections	lin. 320–331	—
Response to Durand's objections	lin. 332–359	—
Palude's position	lin. 360–404	—
Response to the objection	lin. 405–406	—

3. The Edition

The Manuscripts

There are three currently known extant mss. that contain the second book of Palude's *Sentences* commentary. These are:

- B = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek BII 22 (saec. XIV)
- U = Vat. Lat. 1073 (saec. XV)
- P = Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 899 (a. 1472)

Basel, UB BII 22. See also Meyer and Burckhardt's description.⁵⁶ Petrus de Palude: super secundum librum Sententiarum (fols. 1r^a–262v^b; table of questions: fols. 258v^b–262v^b). Fragments: officii corporis Christi; Commentarii in psalmos poenitentiales (on flyleaf).

Incipit (fol. 1r^a): Circa primam distinctionem secundi Sententiarum quaeruntur quinque, primo utrum aliqua creatura potuerit esse ab aeterno; secundo etc.

Explicit: fol. 258v^b: Sed ultimus est unus et idem, scilicet ipse Deus, qui est benedictus in saecula. Amen. *Explicit* secundus. Fol. 262v^b: Expliciunt tituli super secundum.

14th century.

Latin; parchment, 32.5 × 24 cm, ii + 262 + i folios. 22 quires: 1–6¹², 7¹⁰, 8–22¹². Some catchwords on last folio of quires. Foliated with modern pencil (arabic numerals), from fol. 1.

Two columns, writing surface 23/23.5 × 16/17 cm, 50/52 lines, lightly ruled. 14th-century Gothic, possibly French, *textualis media*, written by the same hand. Flyleaves: 14th-century cursive and calligraphic minuscule script (end of 14th century).

Decorations: decorated initials (occupying 2–4 lines) throughout, at the beginning of every question. On fol. 1r^a, two initials (C, P), occupying 5 and 4 lines, respectively. Often decorated with ferns. Running head with the distinction number (roman numerals, on v) and the question number (roman numerals, on r). Occasional marginal corrections and references, possibly by the same hand.

Binding: wooden cover, bound in leather, trimmed. Seal: Fleur de lis, hippocryph.

Origin and provenance: From the Basel Dominican monastery. Former owner unknown. Missing from the Dominican library catalogue. On fol. 1r: *ex lib(ris) Acad(emiae) Bas(iliensis) 1519*. Schmidt lists it in his catalogue.⁵⁷

Vat. Lat. 1073. See also the description in *Codices Vaticani Latini*.⁵⁸ Petrus de Palude: super secundum librum Sententiarum (fols. 1r^a–189r^b; table of questions: fols. 186v^a–189r^b).

56. Gustav Meyer and Max Burckhardt, *Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Basel: Beschreibendes Verzeichnis.*, vol. 1 (Basel: Verlag der Universitätsbibliothek, 1960), 187–190.

57. Philipp Schmidt, “Die Bibliothek des ehemaligen Dominikanerklosters in Basel,” *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 18 (1919): §220.

58. Augustus Pelzer, ed., *Codices Vaticani latini*, vol. 2: Codices 679–1134 (Vatican: Bibliotheca Vaticana, 1931), 629–630.

Incipit (fol. 1r^a): Circa primam distinctionem secundi Sententiarum quaeruntur quinque, etc.

Explicit: fol. 186r^b: Sed ultimus est unus et idem, scilicet ipse Deus qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen. *Explicit* secundus. Fol. 189r^b: Expliciunt tituli super secundum. Finito libro, sit laus et gloria Christo. Amen.

15th century.

Latin; parchment, 40 × 28 cm, i + 190 + i folios. Foliated throughout (arabic numerals), but the numbering is off starting from 58^a (following 58 and preceding 59).

Two columns, writing surface 28×17 cm, 67 lines, ruled throughout. Semi-Gothic, near humanistic book script, early 15th century.

Decorations: decorated initials throughout (2–3 lines), often with fern decorations, at the beginning of distinctions golden letters. On fol. 1r^a 6-line illuminated, inhabited initial (C) with a dominican friar (Aquinas?), holding a book. Occasional marginal corrections and references by the same hand. Frequent paragraph marks. On fol. 1r, on the top, in cursive: ‘*Durandus.*’

Origin and provenance unknown.

Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 899. See also the description in the *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque Mazarine*.⁵⁹ Petrus de Palude: super secundum librum Sententiarum (fols. 1r^a–288r^a; table of questions: fols. 285v^a–288r^a).

Incipit (fol. 1r^a): Circa primam distinctionem secundi Sententiarum quaeruntur quinque, etc.

Explicit: fol. 285v^a: Sed ultimus est unus et idem, scilicet ipse Deus, qui est benedictus in saecula. Amen. Fol. 288r^a: Expliciunt tituli super secundum. Scriptum per manus Arnoldi de Ligno, anno Domini 1472, in profesto beati Benedicti abbatis.

Copied in 1472 (according to the explicit).

Latin; paper, 40 × 29 cm, iii + 288 + ii folios. Foliated throughout (arabic numerals), starting on fol. 1.

Two columns, writing surface 27.5 × 18 cm, 58/60 lines, lightly ruled. According to the explicit, copied in 1472, by Arnold de Ligno; written by the same hand. 15th-century hybrid Gothic script of medium quality.

Decorations: unfinished; empty space left for initials (3–7 lines), but never filled in. Otherwise undecorated. Occasional corrections and section titles on the margin, seemingly by the same hand.

Modern binding.

59. Auguste Molinier, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Mazarine* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1885), 1:422.

Origin and provenance: on the front flyleaf: “Istud volumen Petri do Palude super 2um Sententiarum pertinet conventui Gandensi, ordinis fratrum Predicatorum,” which indicates that it belonged to the Dominican monastery of Gent. Later provenance unknown.

Besides these three mss., Kaeppli lists five additional ones and one early edition of this text,⁶⁰ which, however, are either misattributions or have not been found. The early edition (Paris, 1517) does contain Peter of Palude’s commentary, but not the second book. Los Angeles Libr. of the Univ. of Southern California 3, Bergamo Bibl. civ. Γ 7. 5, and Jena Univ. Bibl. Ms. El. Fol. 43 do not contain Peter of Palude’s commentary at all but commentaries by other authors. I have not been able to find any trace of the Vienna Dominikaner ms., and the collection might have been destroyed. There is also no trace of the Gent, Conv. Ord. Praed. ms.; it is possible that it was also falsely attributed to Peter, or perhaps that the ms. Kaeppli refers to is what is known as Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 899.⁶¹

The existing three manuscripts are generally reliable. They contain the same redaction of the work, and most differences are due mechanical errors or occasional variance in word order. As the mechanical errors show, the manuscripts were probably copied by sight.

P omits the lines preceding the *responsio*, but apart from that, the only significant omissions are errors *per homeoteleuton*. The list of all significant omissions:

<i>Lines</i>	<i>Omitted in</i>
2–3	P
219	U
272–73	U
335–36	P

The oldest manuscript is B, which is also arguably the best one. It is overall reliable, it contains the least number of mechanical errors, and there are no omissions compared to U and P. However, that B is not the original exemplar is likely due to the errors it does contain.

On the other hand, U contains the most mechanical errors, as well as the two

60. Thomas Kaeppli, *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum medii aevi*, vol. 4 vols. (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1970–1993), §3286.

61. I am thankful to several people who helped me establishing the misattribution or non-existence of these mss., and also for helping to acquire the mss. that actually do exist: Henrik Defoort, Russell Friedman, Peter Hartman, and Giorgio Pini.

longer homeoteleutic omissions. Apart from the mechanical errors, however, it has no significant variants compared to B.

The Paris manuscript is perhaps the most interesting one in terms of variants: on the one hand, it contains some mechanical errors that suggest that at least at one point in the history, the scribe did not understand the text and was rather unskilled in Latin grammar (misreading ‘fit’ for ‘sicut,’ ‘enim’ for ‘est verum,’ ‘verum’ for ‘item,’ etc.; readings that neither syntactically nor otherwise could be assumed to be correct). On the other hand, however, in other places, P contains additions that make the text easier to follow or make the argument more explicit.

The number of common errors is insufficient to establish the stemma with certainty. The number of common errors are:

BU:	8
PU:	4
BP:	1
BPU:	1

With the exception of two, all the common errors might be due to independent mechanical errors (e.g., reading *generatio* instead of *genero*, *qua* instead of *quasi*, etc.). The exceptions are: (1) the addition shared by B and U in line 103 (adding *producere* to *perfecte*); and (2) U and P’s reading of *calor* instead of *ignis* (line 178). The only mistake shared by all mss. might have been due to a mechanical error (reading *que* instead of *quia* in line 189), and since neither ms. shares all its errors with any other ms., a direct dependency cannot be established between them.

Thus, either a trichotomic or a a dichotomic stemma is likely, although the latter is perhaps more so, given the common error of B and U. In that case, B and U derived from a common ancestor, which ancestor, however — likely containing already the common mistakes of B and U — is not identical to the archetype. P might have derived from the archetype by the mediation of a different ancestor.

Editorial Principles

Since B is overall the most reliable manuscript as well as the oldest one, the following edition is largely based on B’s reading, occasionally corrected by means of P or U. Since, as noted above, a considerable part of Peter’s text is a repetition of Durand’s, for the sake of comparison I also included the current Durand critical edition in the *apparatus criticus*.⁶² I kept the editorial additions and corrections to minimal.

62. It should be noted that in the collation I only relied on the text of the critical edition. In some cases, where Peter’s text differs from D, it does follow some other ms. variant of Durand’s

The orthography has been standardized according to medieval Latin spelling, which the manuscripts in generally follow although with some inconsistencies. Variants on spelling are not marked in the critical apparatus. Paragraphs and punctuation have been modified and added throughout, and the title of the question as well as the subtitles are also editorial additions. Additions in general are marked with angled brackets.

Abbreviations

<i>a.c.</i>	ante correctionem
<i>add.</i>	addidit (-erunt etc.)
<i>cf.</i>	confera(n)tur
<i>del.</i>	deleuit
<i>exp.</i>	expunxit
<i>lin.</i>	linea
<i>mrg.</i>	in margine
<i>om.</i>	omisit
<i>sup.</i>	supra

References to the Edition

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———. *In Secundum Librum Sententiarum Quaestiones (Ordinatio)*. Venice: Apud Franciscum Zilettum, 1581.

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Aristotle. *Ethica Nicomachea, libri I–III, VIII.1–5 (Burgundii translationis recensio)*: Robertus Grosseteste reuisor translationis Aristotelis. Edited by R A Gauthier. Aristoteles Latinus, vol. 26.1–3. Leiden: Brill, 1972.

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———. *Physica (Translatio uetus)*: Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis. Edited by F Bossier and J Brams. Aristoteles Latinus, vol. 7.1. Leiden: Brill, 1990.

text (most often that of A and occasionally D and V of the Durand edition).

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- Durand of St.-Pourçain. *D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano, Ord. Praed. et Meldensis Episcopi, In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentatorium Libri IIII*. Venice: Ex Typographia Guerraea, 1571.
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- . *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles*. Edited by P Marc, C Pera, and P Caramello. Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1961.
- . *S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones disputatae 2: De potentia; De anima; De spiritualibus creaturis*. Edited by P M Pession. Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1965.

Utrum Deus immediate agat in omni actione

U 5va,
B 7rb,
P 8vb

Quarto queritur utrum Deus immediate agat in omni actione.

Et uidetur quod non, quia *quieuit ab omni opere quod patrarat*

Contra: *operatur omnia in omnibus.*

5 Responso: de ista questione sunt quattuor opiniones, que tractabuntur per ordinem.

⟨Prima opinio: Egidii Romani⟩

Prima opinio dicit quod duo sunt genera effectuum: quidam enim sunt *a solo Deo* creatura nichil cooperante, ut angelus uel celum, et tales effectus sunt a Deo *immediate et totaliter*, id est secundum omnem modum, et de istis non procedit questio; alii sunt effectus causarum secundarum et non solius Dei, et de istis est questio.
10 De quibus dicunt isti quod sunt *a Deo* totum *immediate*, non tamen *totaliter*, hoc est secundum omnem modum. Quod declarant, quia, ut dicunt, *Deus agit uniformiter in omnibus* rebus quantum est de se, ita quod tota diuersitas in effectibus est ex diuersitate recipientium influentiam diuinam propter diuersitatem suarum naturarum. Et ideo effectus, ex ea parte qua sunt a causis secundis, habent distinctionem
15 et non | ex parte Dei. Sic igitur res in quantum sunt, a Deo sunt, quia in hoc non distinguuntur, in quantum autem habent esse distinctum, sunt a causis secundis per quas distinguuntur. Verbi gratia: *in re uiuente idem est penitus uiuere et esse, et ideo totum | est immediate a Deo et totum immediate a secundo agente*, sed non eodem modo, quia *ex parte ipsius esse non est distinctio in rebus, sed per uiuere*
20 *distinguitur* una res ab alia; propter quod *Deus dat esse* et uiuere, sed solum sub ratione ipsius esse in quo nichil distinguitur; *creatura uero dat totum illud sub ratione qua est uiuere ex parte cuius est* in rebus distinctio.

B 7va

U 5vb

Pro hac autem opinione uidetur esse dictum Aristotelis II^o Phisicorum, capitulo De causis, ubi dicit quod effectus particularis reducitur in causam particularem et

2 quieuit – patrarat | Gen 2:2.

3 operatur omnia in omnibus | 1 Cor 12:6.

6 Prima opinio | Aegidius Romanus, *Reportatio*, 208, lin. 19–35. Cf. *Ordinatio* II, d.1, pars 1, q.2, a.6; *Questiones de ente et essentia*, q.4.

24–25 effectus – uniuersalem | Arist., *Phys.* II.3, 195b26–30. Iacobus Veneticus tr.: “Oportet autem semper causam uniuscuiusque summam querere, sicut et in aliis, ut homo edificat quoniam edificator est, edificator autem est secundum edificativam; hec igitur prima causa est, et sic in omnibus;

1–4 Quarto – Responso | *om.* P 7 creatura | creata U 7 effectus | effectibile U 8 id est | et P 11 dicunt | *om.* U 13 ex | *om.*, *add. mrg.* B 14 a | ex D 16 autem | autem *add.* P 17 est penitus | penitus est B; est ponitur U 21 ipsius esse | esse ipsius B

25 uniuersalis in uniuersalem; sed esse est uniuersalissimus effectus; ergo reduci debet in
causam uniuersalissimam, que est Deus. Viuere autem, cum sit effectus particularis,
debet reduci in causam secundam et particularem, ut rationes effectuum respondeant
rationibus causerum.

⟨Contra primam opinionem⟩

30 Hec autem opinio deficit in se et in sua ratione. Quod enim dicit, quod Deus
uniformiter agit in omnibus nec est diuersitas in rebus nisi ex causis secundis, falsum
est, quia secundum hoc impossibile esset quod plura et distincta fierent a Deo sine
causis secundis, et ita Deus non posset diuersa creare, quod est falsum et contradicit
primo dicto eorum, scilicet quod effectus qui sunt a solo Deo sunt ab eo toti et
totaliter, hoc est secundum omnem modum, inquantum habent esse et inquantum
35 habent distinctum esse.

Preterea, agere semper uniformiter et nullo modo difformiter est condicio agentis
naturalis et non uoluntarii. Dicere ergo quod Deus semper quantum est ex parte eius
agat uniformiter et nullo modo difformiter idem est ac si diceretur quod Deus agit
ex necessitate nature et non ex libera uoluntate, quod est falsum.

40 Ratio etiam per quam probant suum propositum non ualet. Quod enim assumunt
quod effectus particularis reducitur in causam particularem et uniuersalis in uniuer-
salem intelligendum est de uniuersali et particulari per predicationem, consimiliter
in causa et effectum, ut patet per exempla que ponit ibidem Philosophus (*ut statue
quidem statuam faciens, hic autem huius*), ita quod, sicut non | est aliud re statua et
45 hec statua, sed ratione tantum, sic non reducuntur in causas diuersas re, sed ratione
tantum, que sunt statuifica et hec statuifica. Et similiter in proposito, cum esse
et uiuere in eodem differant solum ratione, reduci debent in causas solum ratione
differentes, ita quod solum est una causa re que dat esse et uiuere immediate, sed
sub diuersis rationibus, esse quidem inquantum ipsa est ens actu et aliud solum in

P 9ra

amplius autem alie quidem sunt genera generum, alie autem singulare singularium, ut statuam
quidem faciens statue, hic autem huius; et potentias quidem potentium, operantes autem ad opera”
(AL 7.1:62, lin. 7–10).

43–44 ut – huius] *Phys.* II.3, 195b26–27. Iacobus Veneticus tr.: “statuam quidem faciens statue,
hic autem huius” (AL 7.1:62, lin. 9).

26 causam uniuersalissimam] uniuersalissimam causam P 27 respondeant] correspondeant DP
31 et] in U 32 Deus] plura *add.* U 36 et] nichil *add. et exp.* B 37 ergo] enim U 37 semper]
om. D 37 quantum] inquantum U 37 eius] semper *add.* D 38 idem est] est idem D 41
reducitur] *om.* U 42 uniuersali et particulari] particulari et uniuersali D 45–46 ratione tantum]
tantum ratione D 47–48 in – differentes] solum in causas differentes ratione D

50 potentia, uiuere uero in quantum est uiuens actu et aliud uiuens in potentia. Semper enim quod est tale in potentia fit ab eo quod est actu tale, et ita non oportet quod esse et uiuere in eodem secundum rationes eorum differentes reducantur immediate in causas realiter diuersas, puta uiuere in causam secundam, esse autem in causam primam, que est Deus.

55 Quidam tamen imponunt istis quod *esse est effectus communissimus* differens in omnibus ab essentia, et ipsum *est per creationem* a solo Deo, essentia uero *per informationem* ut sic essentia forme sit ab agente naturali. Sed esse compositi et suppositi in omnibus sit a Deo, et quia hoc est intimius, ideo Deus immediate agit.

60 Alii uero dicunt probabilius quod sicut aliqui imaginantur quod species coloris fit in medio a sole et a colore et immediate ab utroque sed immediatius a luce in quantum in uirtute eius color se multiplicat, aut sicut a duobus coloratis fit una species sensibilis in medio, uel sicut a phantasmate et intellectu agente fit species uel intellectio in intellectu possibili, sic etiam a creatura et Deo fit unus effectus, et quidquid creatura producere nititur, oportet nichilominus illum effectum a Deo
65 e-manare.

B 7vb

Auicenna uero uidetur dicere quod Deus est agens dans formam, id est ipsa intelligentia agens, agens uero corporale est agens transmutans solum, ut de omni forma sit idem quod dicimus de anima rationali et accidentibus infusis.

⟨Secunda opinio: Durandi⟩

70 Secunda est opinio quorundam modernorum probabilis et subtilis, dicens quod *ea que fiunt a Deo mediantibus causis secundis non fiunt ab eo immediate, sicut ipsemet rationes terminorum uidentur sonare.*

Quod apparet primo sic: Si Deus ageret immediate ad productionem effectus cause secunde (ut cum ignis generat ignem), aut ageret eadem actione qua creatura aut alia.

Non eadem propter duo.

6–54 Prima – Deus] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 83–147.

55 Quidam] Forte Aquinas, *De potentia*, q.3, a.1 et a.7 (ed. Pession, 39, col. 2, lin. 42 et 58, col. 1, lin. 223).

59 Alii] Non inueni.

66 Auicenna] *Liber de philosophia prima*, tract. 9, cap. 5 (*Auicenna Latinus* 1.4:488–494).

69 quorundam modernorum] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 148–214.

51 tale] *om.* P 56 essentia] esse U 57 sic essentia] sit esse U 57 forme] sic essentia forme *add. et exp.* B 57–58 compositi et suppositi] suppositi et compositi U 58 hoc] *om.* B 58 intimius] intimus U 59 coloris] caloris U 60 fit] sicut P 60 colore] calore U 61 color] calor U 63 Deo] ideo P 66 ipsa] *om.* P 67 intelligentia agens] intelligentiam P 68 sit] fit U 69 modernorum] *om.* U 69 quod] quia P 70 que] dicunt *add. et exp.* U 73 qua] quia U

75 *Primo, quia illam potest habere creatura sine speciali influxu Dei supposita conseruatione sue nature et sue uirtutis actiue, quia actio que non excedit uirtutem speciei agentis sufficienter elicitur a sola uirtute speciei, frustra ergo poneretur aliud immediatum eliciens talem operationem.*

80 *Secundo, quia impossibile est eandem actionem numero esse a duobus uel pluribus agentibus, ita quod a quolibet sit immediate et perfecte, nisi in illis sit eadem uirtus numero; sed in Deo et creatura non potest esse eadem uirtus numero; ergo impossibile est quod eadem actio numero sit ab utroque immediate et perfecte. Actio autem creature immediate est a creatura et perfecte, cum non excedat uirtutem sue speciei; ergo eadem actio non est immediate a Deo.*

85 *Minor de se patet, sed maior probatur. Contingit enim quod eadem | actio numero sit a duobus et a quolibet perfecte, sed ab uno immediate, ab alio | uero mediate, quia eandem actionem, quam facit causa propinqua immediate, facit causa uniuersalis et remota perfecte, inquantum dat uirtutem cause proxime et datam conseruat, et hoc est mediate solum. Alio modo contingit eandem actionem numero esse duorum*
90 *immediate, sed a neutro perfecte, ut cum duo trahunt nauem uel due candele causant unum lumen, quia a neutro perfecte est tractus nauis et a neutra candela per se est et perfecte illuminatio aeris. In talibus enim duo agentia imperfecta supplent uicem unius agentis perfecti. Si autem actio sit immediate et perfecte a quolibet, non apparet modus possibilis, nisi in utroque eorum sit idem principium uel eadem*
95 *uirtus numero. Propter hoc enim dicimus quod in diuinis Pater et Filius una numero spiratione spirant Spiritum Sanctum, et quilibet perfecte, quia in eis est uis spiratiua una numero.*

U 6ra
P 9rb

100 *Vera est ergo maior propositio, scilicet quod eadem actio numero non potest esse a duobus uel pluribus, ita quod a quolibet sit perfecte et immediate, nisi in eis sit eadem uirtus secundum numerum. Minor autem de se manifesta est. Sequitur ergo conclusio, scilicet quod Deus ad effectum cause secunde non agit immediate eadem actione cum creatura.*

Item, nec alia actione, quia aut una illarum actionum prius attingeret productum quam alia aut non, sed utraque simul.

105 *Non una prius quam alia, puta actio Dei prius quam actio creature, quia si Deus sua actione prius rem totam produceret, tunc creatura per suam actionem sequentem nichil faceret. Et econuerso, si actio creature prederet actionem Dei, nec potest dici quod Deus producat partem et creatura partem, quia hic querimus utrum illud idem*

86 sit] sit *add.* U 86 ab alio] ab alio *add.* P 88 perfecte] perfectione U 89 actionem] actione P 90 due] *om.* U 92 perfecte] est *add.* D 92 In] et U 94 nisi] nisi *add.* U 103 illarum] istarum U 103 prius] producere *add.* BU 103 attingeret] attingerit P 107 nec] non P 108 producat] causam *add. et exp.* U

110 *quod producit creatura immediate producat etiam Deus immediate. Prius enim fuit
concessum quod in qualibet creatura materiali est aliquid quod est a Deo immediate,
scilicet materia.*

*Item, nec utraque actio simul attingit productum, quia si hoc esset, altera su-
perflueret, cum una sufficiat ad totum producendum. Et preterea, actiones uidentur
idem esse realiter cum suis | terminis, unde et ab eis sumunt denominationem. Im-
115 possibile est ergo ad acquirendum eandem formam numero esse diuersas actiones.
Patet igitur quod ea que producuntur per actionem creature non producuntur a Deo
immediate. Posset tamen Deus ea immediate producere si uellet, sed tunc creatura
nichil ibi ageret.*

B 8ra

120 *Secundo patet idem sic: Ordo agentium correspondet ordini finium; sed unius rei
non possunt esse duo fines immediati; ergo nec duo agentia, nisi forte supplerent
uicem unius agentis modo quo dictum est de trahentibus nauem, quia consimiliter
possent esse duo immediati fines.*

⟨Obiectiones⟩

125 *Isti autem arguunt contra se dupliciter. Primo, quia sicut se habet unitas ad
constituendum numeros in ratione cause materialis, sic se habet Deus ad creaturas
in ratione cause agentis; sed unitas immediate sui additione ad numeros constituit
omnem numerum preter binarium, quem constituit per se ipsam uel in se replicata:
addita enim binario constituit ternarium et addita ternario constituit quaternarium,
et sic de omnibus; ergo similiter Deus cum aliis agentibus immediate producit omnem
effectum preter primum, quem producit per se ipsum solum.*

130 *Secundo, quia sicut se habet esse ad esse, ita agere ad agere; sed creatura omnino
non esset, nisi Deus immediate ei adesset; ergo nec creatura aliquid ageret, nisi Deus
immediate ei coageret.*

⟨Responsio Durandi ad obiectiones⟩

Et ad ista | respondent isti sic:

P 9va

69–122 ea – fines] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 148–214.

123–132 Isti – coageret] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 3–15.

109 etiam] et U 111 scilicet materia] materia scilicet U 112 esset] *om.* P 114 idem esse] esse
idem D 115 acquirendum] acquirendam BP 116 igitur] ergo P 116 per actionem creature] a
creatura P 119 Secundo] Tertio D 120 nisi] duo agentia *add.* P 120 supplerent] supplet D
121 unius agentis] agentis unius U 125 cause] esse U 125 additione] actione U 126 se] ipsa
add. D 131 ageret] *om.* U 132 immediate ei] ei immediate P 133 respondent] responderent
B; responderet U

135 *Ad primum dicendum per interemptionem minoris. Non enim unitas sui additione cum aliis causat numeros, immo ipsa sola sui replicatione causat omnem numerum materialiter. Sex enim non sunt quinque et unum, sed semel sex uel sex unitates: numerus enim non habet aliam materiam quam unitatem. Est enim numerus multitudo ex unitatibus collecta. Et eodem modo Deus omnia immediate produceret, si uirtutem producendi aliis non communicasset.*

140 *Ad secundum dicendum quod non est simile de esse et agere, quia esse cause secunde, puta intelligentie uel corporis celestis, est immediatus effectus cause prime, que est eius causa immediata non solum in fieri, sed conseruando in esse. Et ideo causa secunda non esset, nisi ei causa prima coexisteret. Sed agere cause secunde non est immediatus effectus cause prime, et ideo non oportet quod Deus ad talem actionem immediate coagat.*

145 *Supponit etiam ratio unum dubium, scilicet quod oporteat Deum immediate coexistere omni creature quantum ad omnia que sunt in ea, quod forte non est uerum, sed solum quoad illa que sunt immediate ab ipso. Hoc tamen non assero, sed primum sufficit ad soluendum rationem.*

⟨Contra secundam opinionem⟩

150 Quamuis autem hec opinio sit probabilis, tamen communis opinio est contraria. Primo, quia in camino puerorum conseruabatur ignis in suo esse et in sua uirtute actiua, non tamen agebat, quia Deus | non coagebat; ergo ignis cum calore non est sufficiens causa calefaciendi, quia posita non sequitur effectus — et idem erit post diem iudicii. Si dicatur quod ignis est sufficiens causa nisi impediatur, quero: quomodo impediabatur? Aut agendo aut actionem subtrahendo. Non agendo, quia nec
155 igni fuit aliud impressum calorem reprimens, quia combussit caldeos et combussit

U 6rb

134–149 Ad – rationem] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 215–235.

151–152 in camino – coagebat] Dan 3:19–30.

153–154 idem erit post diem iudicii] Cf., e.g. Aquinas, *Quaestiones de potentia*, q.5, a.8: “Nam et ignis suo calore transmutat materiam, ex uirtute corporis caelestis; et corpora uisibilia multiplicant suas species in medio, uirtute luminis, cuius fons est in caelesti corpore. Unde si actio utraque corporis caelestis cessaret, nulla actio in istis inferioribus remaneret. Sed cessante motu caeli, cessabit prima actio, sed non secunda; et ideo cessante motu caeli, erit quidem actio in istis inferioribus illuminationis et immutationis medii a sensibilibus; non autem erit actio per quam transmutatur materia, quam sequitur generatio et corruptio” (Ed. Pession, 152, col. 1, lin. 63–68).

134 primum] argumentum *add.* D 135 sola] cum *add.* B 137 enim¹] est uerum P 137 quam] nisi D 140 cause] esse U 141 immediatus] immediate P 143 ei causa prima] causa prima ei immediate D 143 cause] prime *add. et del.* P 147 est uerum] uerum est P 148 sed] cum D 149 ad] ad *add.* P 150 opinio] *om.* P 152–153 est sufficiens] sufficiens est B 153 quia] qua U 156 igni] ignis BU

uincula puerorum, non uestes aut capillos; nec eis fuit aliud impressum, puta frigiditas qua resisteret igni. Et quod dicitur quod angelus Domini *fecit medium fornacis, quasi uentum roris flantem* et huiusmodi, methaphorice dictum est; uel si tunc fuit, saltem post | diem iudicii nichil tale erit. Ergo Deus impediuit solum actionem subtrahendo. B 8rb

Preterea, nichil est causa conseruans immediate nisi quod est immediata causa in fieri eo modo quo conseruat uel effectiue uel dispositiue; cum ergo ignis generat ignem, quero quid conseruat formam generatam immediate in materia. Non potest dici quod generans, quia illud aliquando elongatur; nec aliquod corpus nisi forte continens, illud autem non conseruat semper sed aliquando corrumpit. Nec potest dici quod non indiget conseruante, quia si incorruptibilia indigent conseruante, multo magis corruptibilia, et quandoque actu alterantur ad corruptionem, sicut calor in aqua. Ergo Deus, qui solus est ubique *per essentiam, presentiam, et potentiam*, omnia ubique immediate conseruat, ergo omnia immediate causat; quando ergo ignis generat ignem, Deus cum eo generat, qui sine eo genitum conseruat.

Preterea, si uerum est quod omnis actio inferiorum firmatur in motu celi primo, et cessante motu celi ignis non combureret stupam, et quod dicitur II° De Gen. quod elementa respectu celi agunt *deterius quam organa*, et si uerum est quod dicunt Augustinus et Gregorius quod omnia in nichilum tenderent nisi manu omnipotentis tenentur, qui *portat omnia uerbo uirtutis sue*, ergo nisi ipse agat, nichil ageret.

158–159 angelus – flantem] Dan 3:49–50: “Angelus autem descendit cum Azaria et sociis eius in fornacem et excussit flammam ignis de fornace et fecit medium fornacis quasi uentum roris flantem et non tetigit eos omnino ignis.”

169 Deus – potentiam] Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologie* Ia, q.8, a.3, co.: “Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam, in quantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. Est per presentiam in omnibus, in quantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, in quantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi” (Ed. Leonina, 4:87b).

172–173 omnis – stupam] Cf. Tempier, *Articuli condempnati*, 156: “Quod si celum staret, ignis in stupam non ageret, quia natura deesset” (ed. Piché et Lafleur, 126–127). Etiam Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.15, q.3.

174 elementa – organa] *De Gen.* II.9, 336a13. Morbeke tr.: “Quocirca si quam maxime facit et movet ignis, sed quomodo movet, quoniam deterius quam organa” (AL 9.2).

175–176 omnia – tenentur] Gregorius, *Moralium* XVI, c.37: “Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursus ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret” (PL 75, col.1143C).

176 portat – sue] Heb 1:3: “qui cum sit splendor glorie et figura substantie eius portansque omnia uerbo uirtutis sue purgationem peccatorum faciens.”

157 aliud] aliquid P 158 qua] quasi BU 159 tunc] dictum *add.* U 163 quo] quod P 166 autem] aut P 168 quandoque] quando P 170 quando ergo] ergo quando P 171 eo] id P 172 celi] essentii U

Quod ergo primo dicunt isti, quod ad eliciendum actionem speciei sufficit uirtus
 specifica, non est uerum nisi coagente ei illo a quo sustentatur in esse, sicut ignis
 | agit in uirtute forme substantialis non solum carnem sed etiam calorem, et calor
 180 separatus, nisi uirtus prima sibi conseruaretur, non ageret. Et quidquid esset respectu
 creature, tamen respectu primi agentis simpliciter nullum agens est sufficiens sine eo.

Ad secundum concedatur maior, sed prima probatio non ualet, quia causa uni-
 uersalis aliquando immediate agit, sicut in intellectum possibilem immediate agunt
 intellectus agens tamquam causa uniuersalis et phantasma tamquam causa particu-
 185 laris. Et falsum est quod dicunt, quod utraque causa perfecta est, quia *homo generat*
ex materia hominem et sol, nec alterum per se sufficit; ergo ambo suppleunt uicem
 unius perfecti agentis.

Alia probatio est bona, sed minor illius rationis est falsa, quia actio creature non
 egreditur perfecte ab ea sed imperfecte, quia sine creatore non potest; a Deo autem
 190 non egreditur perfecte, non quia non potest sed quia non uult — uult enim quod
 sit una perfecta actio egrediens a se et a creatura, cui communicat uirtutem agendi.
 Vel potest dici quod egreditur a Deo perfecte, sed a creatura imperfecte, sicut si sol
 et candela concurrant ad illuminationem aeris, quam etsi solus sol faceret eque per-
 fectam, tamen candela concurrens facit ad eam, nec tamen intendit eam (supposito
 195 quod sol sit tantum illuminatiuus quantum aer est illuminabilis). Nec propter hoc
 actio creature superfluit, quia hanc nobilitatem Deus ei tribuit ut cooperetur Deo.

Preterea, ad principale propositum potest sic argui: potentior est forma ad dan-
 dum esse formaliter suo subiecto quam ad multiplicandum se effectiue in alio (unde
 alicue forme debiles esse possunt que agere non possunt, sicut parvus ignis); sed
 200 essentia angeli non sibi sufficit ad esse in se sine Deo agente ad illud esse; ergo nec
 sufficit ad mouere uel agere nisi Deo coagente ad illud. Et sic potest sustineri quod
 sit unum actio Dei et creature, non manens sed transiens.

177 primo dicunt isti] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 153–158; lin. 75–78 sup.

182 secundum] Lin. 79–102 sup.

182 maior] Lin. 79–81 sup.

182 prima probatio] Lin. 85–89 sup.

185–186 homo – sol] Arist., *Phys.* II.2, 194 b14 (AL 7.1:55, lin. 8); *Auct. Arist.* 2, 65 (ed. Hamesse, 145).

188 Alia probatio] Lin. 89–97 sup.

188 minor illius rationis] Lin. 82–83 sup.

197 principale propositum] Lin. 69–71 sup.

178 sustentatur] substetantur B 178 ignis] calor PU 179 etiam] et PU 182 concedatur]
 conceditur P 185 causa] *om.* PU 186 materia] natura U 188 est bona] bona est U 189
 quia] que BPU 190 non] *om.* U 194 facit] faciat P 194 eam] equo U 196 hanc] habent U
 198 alio] alia U 200 essentia] esse U

Ad tertium potest dici quod essent due actiones; si enim actio in motu non est
nisi esse ab hoc, ergo esse, a diuersis maxime equiuoce agentibus, est esse diuersas
205 actiones. Nec tamen una attingit partem nec prius, sed utraque simul attingit totum
effectum; nec diuina superfluit, quia sine illa creatura non sufficeret, nec creatura
superfluit quoad Dei uoluntatem (licet superfluat quoad necessitatem), quia sine
creatura | posset si uellet, sed non uult.

B 8va

Ad quartum dicendum quod physice loquendo *actio et passio* non differunt a
210 motu et termino, quia non sunt sensibilia sine eo; sed metaphysice loquendo actio et
passio et motus differunt re a terminis, quia preter operationem intellectus est inter
ea realis diuersitas ex natura rei. Unde cum constet intensionem et remissionem
eiusdem forme esse actiones et passionem et motus contrarios, et tamen est eadem
forma numero et essentialiter (ut isti dicunt primo libro d. 17^o), patet quod ad
215 eandem formam numero possunt terminari diuersae numero actiones. Et si quidem
actio sit in agente substantiue, cum idem accidens | non sit in diuersis subiectis,
oportet quod secundum diuersitatem agentium sit diuersitas actionum. Si autem
actio sit in passo, si sunt agentia unius rationis, erit actio una specie et per consequens
numero, ex quo subiectum est unum numero; si autem sunt agentia diuersarum
220 rationum, erunt actiones diuersae specie et | per consequens numero, licet sit unus
effectus specie et numero. Unde quando sol et ignis calefaciunt aliud, est unus calor
specie et numero impressus, sed tamen uidentur esse duo caleferi, quia alia specie
relatio consurgit ad solem, qui calefacit equiuoce, et ad ignem, qui calefacit uniuoce.
Si autem fundamentum esset unius rationis, et relationes essent eiusdem rationis;
225 multo magis igitur est hoc respectu Dei, ad quem nunquam est relatio eiusdem
rationis et ad creaturam, quia nunquam sic se habet creatura ad creaturam aliam
sicut ad creatorem.

U 6va

P 10ra

Ad quintum dicendum quod ordo agentium sic respondet ordini finium quod

203 tertium] Lin. 103–111 sup.

203 actio in motu] Cf. *Auct. Arist.* 33, 9 : “Omnis actio in motu et omnis motus in actione firmabitur” (ed. Hamesse, 306).

209 quartum] Lin. 112–118 sup.

209–210 actio – motu] *Auct. Arist.* 2, 101: “Actio et passio sunt unus motus et in passo sicut in subiecto” (ed. Hamesse, 148).

214 ut isti dicunt] Hec questio deest in priore redactione commenti Durandi super Sententias quam cognoscimus, habetur autem in tertia redactione (communiter nuncupata C, ed. Venetiis 1517). Cf. Lib. I, d.17, q.7: “Utrum eadem forma numero possit esse intensa et remissa,” quam Durandus soluit affirmatiue.

228 quintum] Lin. 119–122 sup.

228–230 ordo – finem] Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* III, c.17,7.

203 potest] posset PU 205 Nec] non P 206 creatura] creata BU 212 realis] re alia U 212 intensionem] intensionem U 221 ignis] simul *add.* P 225 igitur] *om.* P

superius agens intendit supremum finem immediate, et secundum agens medium
230 finem (ut dicitur in principio Ethicorum), non autem sic quod ad unum finem et
immediate intentum non possint concurrere plura agentia — sicut plures trahentes
nauem possunt intendere unum finem numero.

Preterea, possunt esse duo fines eque immediate uoliti, quia unico actu uoluntatis
qui est de fine proximo et remoto, licet de uno propter alium, sed non eque immediate
235 attincti uel consecuti. Et similiter possunt esse plura agentia eque immediata sed
unum propter aliud; et istud erit agens imperfectum, aliud perfectum. Nec propter
hoc aliud superfluit, quia uoluntarie illud sibi adiungit, sicut etiam finis medius
imperfecte desideratur, sed finis ultimus perfecte.

In solutione autem primi argumenti contra se inducti bene dicunt quod nichil
240 aliud re quam unitas causat numerum omnem, si uerum sit quod ipsi supponunt,
quod numerus non dicat rem abstractam differentem a quantitate continua. Quod
tamen est dubium, quia linea diuisa etiam sine operatione intellectus aliter se habet
nunc et prius, non quod sit maior aut minor, sed quia prius erat continua, nunc
discontinua. Sicut continuitas est res quedam, ita et discontinuitas sibi opposita
245 per differentias formales diuidentes quantitatem; sed discontinuitas est formaliter
quantitas distincta siue ipsa distinctio quantitatis, que est numerus; ergo numerus
est res, et non ens rationis nec pura priuatio continuitatis, quia illa est punctus.
Si dicatur quod non est unum accidens numero in diuersis subiectis, omnis autem
numerus est huiusmodi, dicendum quod non idem modus essendi convenit omnibus,
250 sicut aliter sunt successiua et permanentia, et similiter aliter est quantitas continua
que est in uno, aliter distincta que est in pluribus. Vel sicut non dicitur albedo alba,
sed superficies per eam, sic numerus non est unum nec multa, sed ratio qua aliud
est unum uel multa — nisi forte unitate et multitudine que consequuntur ens, et sic
binarius est quid unum, non tamen unitate que est principium numer(or)um, sed que
255 conuertitur cum ente; et duo binarii sunt duo quedam dualitate ei opposita. Sed non

229–230 superius – finem] *Eth.* I.1, 1094a14–15. Grosseteste tr.: “In omnibus itaque ARCHITECTONICARUM fines omnibus sunt desiderabiliores (seu eligibiliores), hiis que sub ipsis. Horum enim gracia, et illa PERSEQUUNTUR” (AL 26.2:141, lin. 18).

239 solutione autem primi argumenti] Lin. 123–129 sup.

239 bene dicunt] Lin. 134–139 sup.

229 intendit – agens] *om.* U 231 intentum] intantum P 235 attincti] intenti P 235 consecuti] assecuti U 239 autem] a B; de U 239 quod] quia P 240 omnem] Sed *add.* U 240 sit] illud *add.* B; est P 240 ipsi supponunt] supponunt ipsi B 242 tamen] tam U 244 discontinua.] Igitur *add.* U 244 Sicut] ergo *add.* P 244 continuitas] discontinuitas *a.c.* B 247 priuatio] *om.*, *add. mrg.* P 249 huiusmodi] huius BU 249 non] est *add.* B 249 convenit] pluribus *add. et exp.* B 250 permanentia] permanentia P 251 distincta] discreta P 253 consequuntur] consequuntur P

uidetur quod unum quod conuertitur cum ente magis possit esse | simul in diuersis B 8vb
subiectis situ distinctis quam unum quod est principium numerorum. Et hec sint
solum dubitatiue dicta.

Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut omnis forma que dependet in esse a corpore
260 dependet ab eo in agere et non econuerso (unde omnis actio anime corruptibilis est
coniuncti et sola operatio anime rationalis est ei propria, quia potest esse sine corpore
et per consequens operari), sic omnis creatura, | que dependet a Deo secundum esse, P 10rb
dependet etiam in operari, sic scilicet quod sicut suum esse est a Deo et conseruatur
immediate, sic sua actio est a Deo immediate et immediate conseruatur a Deo. Nemo
265 enim potest dare alteri quod non habet; unde si celum non conseruat se in esse, non
potest dare suo effectui quod conseruet se, nec iterum celum potest suum effectum
conseruare, quia non potest seipsum conseruare, ergo multo minus aliud; ergo Deus
utrumque conseruat. Si dicatur quod celum, licet non possit se conseruare, tamen
eo ipso quod conseruatur potest aliud conseruare quamdiu conseruatur, et sic ipsum
270 solum immediate conseruat, sicut ignis calefacit aquam et aqua immediate se bal-
neantem in ea, non est simile, quia amoto igne adhuc ad horam manet calor in aqua,
unde ignis non erat tota causa conseruans sed aliqua alia.

Quod autem dicunt quod illis solum oportet Deum adesse que sunt immediate ab
ipso et non omnibus simpliciter, non est uerum, quia Deus potest immediate omnia
275 annihilare, et remanentibus omnibus causis extrinsecis annihilabit effectum. Hec
autem annihilatio non est per actionem positiuam (quia illa requirit uel substan-
tiam, sicut corruptio, uel terminum ad quem realem, sicut creatio); ergo est per
subtractionem realis influxus. Cum ergo omnis influxus Dei in causis remaneat (ut
suppono), preter illum erat specialis influxus in creatum, cuius subtractione ipsum
280 annihilatur.

⟨Tertia, uera opinio: Thome⟩

Tertia opinio est que uidetur esse Sancti Thome, et est uera si bene intelligatur.
Est igitur opinio quod omnes effectus sunt a Deo inquantum habent esse, a creatura

259 secundum] Lin. 130–132 et 140–145 sup.

264–265 Nemo – habet] *Auct. Arist.* 37, 23: “Nihil dat quod non habet” (ed. Hamesse, 333)

273 Quod autem dicunt] Lin. 146–149 sup.

281 Sancti Thome] Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.1, a.4 (ed. Mandonnet, 25–26).

282–290 omnis – creatura] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 33–44.

257 situ] sic U 257 unum quod] unumquodque U 257 numerorum] numerum BU 261 op-
eratio] opinio U 263 etiam] et P 263 suum] *om.* U 265 alteri] alii P 265 quod] quid P
266 effectui] effectum U 269 quamdiu] quod B 270 et] *om.* P 274 immediate omnia] omnia
immediate U 282 omnes] tales D

autem inquantum habent determinatum esse. Quod uidentur sic probari: *Nullius rei totum esse sumit principium ab aliqua creatura, cum ad esse rei faciat materia, que a solo Deo creatur.* Ad distinctionem autem esse nichil facit materia, sed solum forma, quam creatura in | materia presupposita inducit. Ex hoc arguitur sic: Deus creans materiam operatur immediate ad esse rei, creatura autem dans formam operatur ad esse distinctum. *esse autem est magis intimum rei quam ea per que determinatur (unde remanet aliis remotis, ut dicitur prima propositione De causis).* Ergo in omni re Deus est causa intimius et immediatius operans quam aliqua creatura.

U 6vb

⟨Obiectiones Durandi⟩

Contra istam opinionem quidam arguunt dicentes quod *hec responsio non uidetur esse ad propositum, et quod assumit etiam falsum.*

Quod non sit ad propositum, patet, quia aliud est dicere quod Deus producat immediate aliquid quod est in creatura, scilicet materiam, que est altera pars substantie composite, quod utique uerum est nec hoc querit questio; et aliud est dicere quod Deus producat immediate omne illud quod producit creatura. Cum enim actio creature attingat formam ut terminum sue actionis et non materiam, ut ipsimet dicunt, querimus utrum ipsam formam rei naturalis, ad quam immediate attingit actio creature, attingat etiam actio Dei immediate. Ipsi autem pertractant primum et non secundum, ut patet ex medio quod adducunt, et ideo non est ad propositum.

Assumit etiam falsum. Quod enim dicunt quod esse est intimius rei quam ea que ipsum determinant, si intelligatur quod esse in potentia sit intimius rei quam esse in actu per quod determinatur, falsum | est. Sicut enim per formam quelibet res est uerius id quod est quam per materiam, ut dicitur II^o Phisicorum, sic esse

B 9ra

289 remanet aliis remotis] Cf. *Liber de causis*, prop. 1, 1–2: “Cum ergo causa universalis secunda virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea” (ed. Pattin, 134, lin. 3–5).

300 medio quod adducunt] Lin. 288–289 sup.

303–304 per formam – materiam] Cf. Arist., *Phys.*, II.1, 193b3–8. Iacobus Veneticus tr.: “Quare alio modo natura utique erit habentium in se ipsis motus principium forma et species, que non separata est sed aut secundum rationem; quod autem est ex istis natura quidem non est, sed natura, ut homo. Et magis natura hec est quam materia” (AL 7.1:48, lin. 4).

283 determinatum] distinctum B 283 probari] probare D 284 sumit principium] suum principium sumit D 284–285 que – materia] om. U 286 in] illi U 286 materia presupposita] presupposita materia D 286 arguitur] om. D 290 causa] om. D 290 intimius] intimus U 291 responsio] autem positio D 292 assumit] assumitur U 297 sue actionis] actionis sue D 299 attingat] attingit P 299 etiam] ipsa add. B 301 intimius] intimus U 302 intimius] intimus U 304 res] om. U 304 uerius] id add. P

305 *actu est uerius et intimius esse rei quam esse in potentia. Si autem intelligatur*
quod esse actuale in sua communitate sumptum | intimius est rei quam ea per que P 10va
determinatur ad hoc esse uel ad illud quod est esse uiuens uel esse intellectuale, tunc
variant propositum suum, ut de se patet. Quod etiam non uidetur uerum, quia que
310 *penitus sunt idem unum non est alio intimius rei; sed esse et determinatum esse*
in una et eadem re, sicut in planta, sunt penitus idem re (uiuere enim uiuentibus
est esse); ergo unum non est rei intimius quam alterum loquendo realiter; secundum
rationem tamen esse in communi intimius est rei quam perfectiones determinantes
ipsum, et secundum intellectum nostrum prius aduenit et posterius recedit. Separatur
315 *enim secundum rationem ab aliis, quia communius est, ut in preallegata propositione*
dicitur. Sed ex hoc non potest haberi quod Deus immediatius operetur in omni re
quam aliqua creatura, immo nec quod operetur immediate, quia uniuersalia non fiunt
nisi factione singularium. Et ideo res non sunt ab aliquo in quantum habent esse, nisi
quia sunt ab eodem in quantum habent hoc determinatum esse, cuius oppositum pro
conclusionem ponit hec opinio

320 Quidquid autem sit de opinione et de impugnatione uerum est quod ratio non
probat Deum agere immediate in omni actione creature, immo nec in aliqua. Si
enim Deus non aliter agit nisi quia materiam producit, in illa sola actione immediate
agit in qua uel cum qua est creatio materie; hoc autem non est in aliqua actione
325 creature, nisi forte quando ex speciebus in sacramento altaris aliquid generatur, si
tunc Deus ibi creat materiam et natura inducit formam. Ibi enim ad productionem
totius immediatius agit in quantum presupponitur materia ad hoc quod de ea forma
educatur.

Preterea, esse est magis a forma quam a materia; unde si tota forma esset a
creatura et sola materia a Deo, plus ageret creatura in productione rei quam Deus.

330 Preterea, multe actiones sunt in intellectualibus in quibus non est materia, de
quibus non datur ratio immediationis.

⟨Responsio ad obiectiones⟩

Potest tamen sic sustineri opinio quod actio realis creature, que infert passionem

310–311 uiuere – esse] Arist., *De An.*, II.4, 415b13. Morbeka tr.: “Viure autem uiuentibus est esse” (AL 12.2:95, col. 2, lin. 5).

291–319 hec – opinio] Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.4, lin. 45–82.

307 ad hoc] adhuc P 307 ad] *om.* B 308 suum] suis U 308 Quod] Et D 308 uidetur uerum]
uerum uidetur U 309 alio intimius rei] intimius rei alio D 310 sunt] idem *add.* P 310 penitus]
ponitus P 312 rei] dei U 316 nec quod] quod nec B 328 est magis] magis inest B 329 rei
quam] re quod U 330 actiones] rationes U

335 proprie dictam, supponit materiam; inquantum ergo Deus sustentat continue mate-
 riam et continue creat in qua omnis actio creature mediate uel immediate suscipitur,
 intantum immediate agere dicitur, quia et materiam applicat qui eam sustentat et
 eam disponit qui aptitudinem naturalem, qua est susceptibilis, in ea custodit — si-
 cut qui ceram applicaret et mollificaret, immediate ad impressionem sigilli ageret.
 Videtur tamen contra id quod illi dicunt reprobando opinionem, quod esse possibile
 sit intimius rei quam esse actuale, quia illud est rei intimius quod est in re prius et
 340 posterius; sed hoc est esse possibile. Prius est enim res in potentia quam in actu, quia
 quod est potest esse, non autem omne quod potest esse, est; item, postquam res non
 est, adhuc potest esse, unde esse in potentia prius aduenit et posterius recedit; ergo
 est intimius, et hoc secundum rem, ubi ista differunt secundum rem, sicut in com-
 positis ex materia et forma materia etiam est prior forma (I^o Phisicorum: *subiectum*
 345 *est prius predicato*) et remanet post formam corruptam.

De esse uero in communi uerum dicunt quod secundum rationem, non secundum
 rem, est intimius et prius et posterius; sed cum hoc non uidetur stare quod sequitur,
 quod uniuersale non | fit nisi per hoc quod singulare fit, quia fieri terminatur ad
 esse (unde illud uidetur prius fieri cui prius competit esse, sicut composito, cui prius
 350 competit esse quam forme, prius competit fieri quam forme); si igitur uniuersale prius
 est quam singulare, ergo prius fit — sed uerum est quod uniuersale per se nunquam
 fit prout est distinctum ratione a singulari.

Preterea, si celum pro tanto dicitur non immediatum agens, quia determinatur
 a particulari coagente, ipsum indeterminatum existens, | cum Deus non solum sit
 355 agens uniuersale, immo et determinet seipsum, esse determinatum ita est a Deo sicut
 indeterminatum. Licet ergo uno | modo possit saluari immediatio actionis diuine in
 omni effectum per hoc quod ipse immediate conseruat illud in quo actio recipitur et
 illud a quo actio egreditur, quod in corporalibus est materia, in aliis aliud loco materie
 immediate a Deo creatum, ut essentia, tamen non propter hoc negantur alii modi.

P 10vb

B 9rb

U 7ra

338 illi dicunt] Sc., Durandus, ut sup.

344–345 subiectum – predicato] *Auct. Arist.* 2, 19 (ed. Hamesse, 141).

335 et] etiam U 338 id] illud U 338 reprobando] improbando P 338 possibile] potentiale
 P 340 possibile] potentiale P 340 est enim] enim est P 340 quam] quod U 341 quod] quid
 U 341 quod] quid U 341 item] uerum P 342 esse] est U 342 potentia] potentie U 343
 intimius] intimus U 343 ubi] nisi U 349 esse] *om.* P 350 esse – competit] *om.* P 350
 igitur] ergo P 352 est] *om.* B 354 ipsum] est *add.* P 354 indeterminatum] determinatum P
 354 existens] ens U 355 et] etiam B 359 essentia] esse U

⟨Quarta opinio: Petri de Palude⟩

360 Quarta opinio potest concludi ex omnibus predictis.

Ad cuius euidenciam tria uidenda sunt: primo quod Deus conseruat omnia immediate quoad omne esse; secundo quod ipse agit immediate in omni actione; tertio quod per actionem distinctam formaliter licet non materialiter.

Primum patet sic, quia omne quod est aut est ingenerabile (ut euiterna) aut
365 generabile; constat autem quod omne euiternum a solo Deo conseruatur immediate, a quo solo efficitur, quia causa in conseruari non est nisi illa que est in fieri. De generabilibus autem idem patet dupliciter: primo, quia si celum non sufficit sibi ad conseruandum seipsum nisi immediate a Deo conseruetur, multo minus sufficit ad conseruandum aliud nisi in conseruando adiuuetur immediate a Deo, quia forma
370 plus nata est conseruare suam materiam quam alienam. Preterea, cum Deus possit annihilare omnia contenta retentis omnibus continentibus cum omnibus suis uirtutibus, et hoc non sit per actionem ueram, que uel habet subiectum, ut corruptio, uel terminum, ut creatio, sed per subtractionem influentie et actionis, que non habet subiectum nec terminum, non est hoc per corruptionem actionis aliene, sed per subtractionem actionis proprie, id est conseruationis sue; ergo illam rem conseruabat.
375

Secundo, ex hoc quod ipse immediate agit in omni actione. Primo ex parte effectus actionis, sic: ille qui immediate conseruat omne productum, immediate egit ad eius productionem, quia conseruatio non est nisi productionis continuatio; sed Deus immediate conseruat omne productum; ergo immediate producit omne quod
380 producitur.

Secundo ex parte agentis, sic: plus sufficit aliquid sibi ad essendum quam ad aliud producendum; sed nulla creatura sufficit sibi ad esse nisi Deo conseruante immediate; ergo nec ad agere nisi Deo coagente.

Tertio, quod per aliam actionem. Ubi sciendum quod distinctio actionum ex
385 principiis est per causam efficientem, ex terminis per causam finalem, et neutra per causam formalem, cum actio sit predicamentum distinctum ab omni principio et termino suo, unum autem predicamentum non distinguitur formaliter | differentiis alterius, quia diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diuerse sunt species et differentie. Sed dicuntur actio et passio unus motus materialiter et subiec-
390 tiue, quia actio est in passo. Si ergo agentia unum effectum sunt unius rationis, erit

P 11ra

389-390 actio – passo] *Auct. Arist.* 2, 101; cf. lin. 209 sup.

360 predictis] infra statim *add.* P 364 ingenerabile] generabile B 365 constat] constatant B
366 causa] huius *add.* P 369 forma] *om.* P 370 est] forma *add.* P 372 habet] *om.* P
374 per] actionem *add. et exp.* B 386 actio] acto U 386 predicamentum] preiunctum U 388
generum] *om.* U 389 motus] modus U

duorum agentium unum effectum in uno subiecto una actio numero, quia est una
 specie habens unum subiectum (ut duorum trahentium nauem unum trahere et non
 solum unum trahi uel unus tractus et duorum luminarium unum illuminare, quia
 395 lumen est unius rationis, non solum in termino sed in principiis). Quando autem
 sunt agentia in quantum huiusmodi diuersarum rationum, sicut particulare et uni-
 uersale, uidentur esse diuerse actiones propter duo. Primo, quia aliquando una est
 uniuoca, alia equiuoca, sicut *homo generat hominem et sol*; generatio autem uniuoca
 et equiuoca non sunt unius rationis in genere actionis et modo agendi. Secundo, quia
 400 diuerse relationes habent diuersa fundamenta in eodem subiecto; sed alia relatione
 refertur homo genitus ad generantem patrem, puta filiatione, alia ad solem, cuius
 non est filius; hoc autem non est propter diuersitatem termini accepti, qui est unus;
 | ergo propter diuersitatem ipsius actionis. Multo magis ergo actio qua Deus in omni
 actione creata agit differt ab illa maxime. Tertio, quia a principiis diuersis specie
 emanant diuerse actiones. B 9va

405 Ad argumentum dicendum quod loquitur de opere creationis, non propagationis,
 de quo dicit: *pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor*.

397 homo – sol] *Auct. Arist.* 2, 65; cf. lin. 186 sup.

405 argumentum] Lin. 2 sup.

406 pater – operor] Joan 5:17.

393 illuminare] luminare B 395 huiusmodi] huius U 395–396 particulare et uniuersale] uni-
 uersale et particulare B 397 alia] est *add.* P 397 generatio] genero BU 400 homo] *om.* P
 404 emanant] emanarat U