


Divine Concurrence with Sinful Volitions in Some Lesser Known Franciscans

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B = Breslau, Univ. 195 (I F 184)

V = Vatican Borghese 346

1. “Second, because since even an act of sin is some being, not only in the sense in which privations and negations are said to be beings, but also in the sense in which things in the genus of existing things are beings. . . it would follow, if the sinful actions are not from God, that there is some being, having an essence, which is not from God; and in this way, God would not be the universal cause of all beings. . . . And therefore we should say with the first opinion that the act, insofar as it is an act, is from God.”
2. “The first of these is solved by that that God foreknows that he would cooperate Lucifer insofar as the substance of that action, which will be the sin, is concerned. . . .”
3. “God does not necessarily coacts with the will in its volition, but only causes the free will, and then this itself, by its freedom can elicit the act, God not coacting except by that first influx.”
4. “If God concurred (with acts of the will), then the act of the will would not be more in the power of the will than any other merely natural act (is in the power of the natural agent). . . ; the consequent is false. Proof of the inference: the reason why merely natural creation is not in the power (of the agent) is because God coacts with the natural agent when the patient is near, even though sometimes he can also not coact. . . . But God not coacting the fire does not burn, as is clear from the example of the Babylonian furnace. Therefore, if God were an immediate efficient cause. . . the act of the will would not be more in the power (of the will) than the act of fire is in the wood.”
5. “God does not bring about anything outside of himself except by willing; thus, his bringing about a thing is nothing except his willing that thing to be. Therefore, if God brought about the underlying positive act of sin, he would will that act to be; therefore, he would will contradictories.”

Aquinas, *In Sent.* II.37.2.2.co: Secundo, quia cum actio etiam peccati sit ens quoddam, non solum secundum quod privationes et negationes entia dicuntur, sed etiam secundum quod res in genere existentes entia sunt. . . . sequeretur, si actiones peccati a Deo non sunt, quod aliquod ens essentiam habens a Deo non esset; et ita Deus non esset universalis causa omnium entium. . . . Et ideo cum prima opinione dicendum est, quod actus, inquantum actus, a Deo est.

Scotus, *Ordinatio* I.41.1.40 (Vat. 6:336): Primum istorum solvitur per hoc quod Deus praescit se cooperaturum Lucifero ad substantiam illius actus qui erit peccatum. . . .

Gonteri Brito, *In Sent.* II.37.1, B 657vb: Deus non necessario coagit voluntati in volendo, sed solum causat voluntatem liberam, et ipsa ex se tunc per libertatem potest elicere actum Deo non coagente nisi secundum primum influxum.

Ibid., B 657vb: Arguo sic: (si Deus coagat,) actus voluntatis non magis esset in potestate voluntatis quam esset quidquid alius actus mere naturalis, cuius principium est aliqua forma naturalis agens per modum naturae; consequens est falsum. Probatio consequentiae: hoc est causa quare creatio mere naturalis non est in potestate. . . , quia Deus coagit agenti naturali approximato passo, etsi posset quandoque non coagere. . . . Nam statim Deo non coagente ignis non combuerit, ut patet de fornace Babylonis. Ergo si Deus esset causa efficiens immediata. . . non esset actus volendi in sua potestate magis quam actus ignis in ligno.

Ibid., B 658ra: Deus non agit aliquid extra se nisi volendo; unde ipsum agere rem non est nisi ipsum velle rem esse. Ergo si Deus ageret actum positivum substratum peccato, vult illum actum esse; ergo vult contradictoria.

6. "We can say without any error that God does not immediately cause the act of any will, nor does he coact with the will except by the fact that he created it as free and that he conserves the freedom in being. And this freedom, by itself, is a sufficient principle to elicit the act of any will, as long as it is conserved in being by God, so that it does not require God's action. . . . The same is the case even concerning a natural form, as can be seen: it is not necessary that God would act in any other way except by conserving it in being."
 7. "One difference between accidentally and essentially ordered causes is that accidentally ordered causes do not concur to the production of the effect. E.g., if Socrates generates Plato and it happens that he had been generated by his father, sc. Cicero[!], it is not necessary that in the generation of Plato Socrates's father be present. But it *is* necessary, when generating Plato that the action of the sun concur, which is a universal cause to which the other causes are subordinated essentially."
 8. "To the first I say that we can understand the concurring action of a superior cause to the inferior cause in two ways. First, that the superior cause elicits the action to the patient immediately. . . and in this way the sun and man produce a man. . . . And these causes are said to be ordered essentially. Second, causes can concur to the production of an effect so that the action of the first cause concurs not immediately in the patient, but concurs by conserving the agent in being, and not concurring in this way the effect would not come to be since the agent would recede into nothing. And this cause, concurring this way, is no less essential than the other, but rather more, since without the other the cause can do something, but without this, nothing. This is the way in which God concurs with the action of a secondary cause."
 9. "There does not seem to be any reason why God can suspend the action of a secondary cause while the patient is present, except that he substracts his action, because does not coact with it, as is commonly said."
 10. "To the second I say that since the nature of the agent thing is something absolute, prior according to its nature to its action, hence God, without contradiction, can will the prior one to be while willing the posterior not to be; and thus sometimes he wills the fire to be and the burning not to be. And thus this is not because he substracts his immediate concurring action to the heat-making. For example: to that, that a lord would will and make a servant let go of its work, it is not necessary that he would substract his action by which he immediately directs the servant to act, since there was never such an action to start with."
 11. "I grant that by conserving the fire and the burning of the fire, God cannot bring about that the fire does not act, naturally speaking, or by his ordained power; he could, however, suspend the action and effect of the fire according to his *(absolute)* power."
- Ibid., B 658va: Ideo ut videtur, sine omni errore potest dici quod Deus non immediate causat actum voluntatis quicumque, nec coagit voluntati nisi quia primo creavit eam liberam et illam libertatem in esse conservat. Et illa libertas ex se sit principium sufficiens eliciendi actum voluntatis quaecumque, dummodo conservetur in esse a Deo, ita quod non requiritur alia actio Dei. . . . Ita etiam de forma naturali, ut videtur, non oportet quod alio modo agat nisi conservando eam in esse, et ipsa agat.
- Ibid., B 258vb: In hoc est differentia una inter causas accidentaliter ordinatas et causas essentialiter ordinatas, quia causae accidentaliter ordinatae non concurrunt ad effectum producendi. Verbi gratia: accidit Socrati in quantum generat Platonem quod Socrates fuit genitus a patre suo, scilicet Cicerone, et ideo in generando Platonem non oportet quod intersit pater Socratis. Sed in generando Platonem oportet necessario quod concurrat actio solis, qui est causa universalis cui aliae causae subordinantur essentialiter.
- Ibid., B 658vb: Ad primum dico quod actionem causae superioris concurrere ad actionem causae secundae potest dupliciter intelligi: vel quod agens superius eliciat actionem immediate circa passum. . . et hoc modo sol et homo faciunt *(hominem)*. . . Et ista causa dicitur essentialiter ordinata esse. Praeterea, alio modo potest causa concurrere ad effectum producendum ita quod actio causae primae concurrat non immediate ad passum, sed concurrat conservando agens in esse, quo non concurrente sub hoc modo non fieret effectus, quia agens in nihil decideret. Et ista causa hoc modo concurrens non minus est essentialis quam alia, immo magis, quia sine alia potest aliquid facere, sine ista nihil. Hoc modo Deus concurrat ad actionem causae secundae.
- Ibid., B 658vb: Non videtur alia ratio quare potest Deus suspendere actionem causae secundae praesente passo, nisi quia subtrahit actionem suam, quia non coagit sibi, sicut communiter dicitur.
- Ibid., B 659ra: Ad secundum dico quod quia natura rei agentis est aliquod absolutum, prius secundum naturam sua actione, et ideo Deus sine contradictione potest velle prius esse volendo posterius non esse; et ideo vult quandoque ignem esse et calefactionem non esse. Et ideo ita est non quia subtrahit actionem suam concurrentem immediate ad calefactionem faciendam. Verbi gratia: ad hoc quod Dominus velit et faciat servum dimittere opus suum, non oportet subtrahere actionem suam qua immediate direxit eum in agendo, quia nunquam talis actio infuit.
- Auriol, *In Sent.* II.38.1.1, Zanetti 304, Florence 133ra: Concedo quod conservando ignem et ignitionem ignis, non posset Deus facere quin ignis ageret, naturaliter loquendo, sive de potentia ordinaria; posset tamen suspendere actum et effectum ignis secundum potentiam suam.