

Durand of St.-Pourçain on Gappy Existence

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T1 God can repair permanent entities that were previously destroyed.

T2 Created agents cannot repair permanent entities that were previously destroyed.

T3 God cannot repair successive entities that were previously destroyed.

T4 Created agents cannot repair successive entities that were previously destroyed.

1. The fourth opinion is intermediate between these, and is more common, namely that a successive [entity after] ceasing to exist can be repaired the same in number by no created or divine power, nor indeed can any permanent [entity be repaired the same in number after ceasing to exist] by created [power] but only by the divine power.

2. Although the same subject can successively possess opposite forms or relations [habitudines], it is nevertheless impossible and implies a contradiction that of the opposite forms or relations one be the other either at the same time or successively – just as it is possible that the same water be first hot and afterwards cold or that the same human first sit and afterwards stand, but impossible that heat be coldness or sitting be standing. But if the same successive or transient thing were repaired, it would follow that one relation would be another. . . . The parts of a succession are before and after, or rather, priority and posteriority. . . therefore if the part of a motion that existed before could really be repaired again, the relation of priority would become the relation of posteriority, which is impossible.

3. When something depends per se and by necessity on something else, having multiplied the latter, it is necessary that the former thing be multiplied too. But a form that is produced depends per se and by necessity on its production. . . . Therefore having multiplied the action, it is necessary that the form produced [by the action] also be multiplied. But the action by which a thing is first produced and the [action] by which it is subsequently repaired are numerically distinct; so is, therefore, the form that is the term of the first production, numerically distinct from the form that is the term of the second. It is clear, however, that these actions are two and not one, since whichever of them is a motion or a mutation following motion, but motions that happen at diverse times and the mutations following such motions are necessarily diverse motions and diverse mutations as far as the course of nature is concerned.

John of Naples, *Quodl.* VI, q. 7: “Quarta opinio est quae mediat inter istas, et est communior, scilicet quod per nullam potentiam creatam vel divinam successivam (ut motus vel tempus) desinens potest idem numero reparari, nec etiam permanens per potentiam creatam sed per potentiam divinam” (Vat. Lat. ms. 772, 97vb).

Durand, *In Sent.* IV, d. 43, q. 3: “[L]icet idem subiectum possit successive esse sub oppositis formis vel habitudines, impossibile tamen est et contradictionem implicat quod oppositarum formarum vel habitudinem una sit alia, neque simul neque successive, sicut possibile est quod eadem aqua primo sit calida et postea frigida vel quod idem homo primo sedeat et postea stet; set impossibile est quod caliditas sit frigiditas vel quod sedere sit stare; set si idem successivum vel transiens posset reparari, sequeretur quod una habitudo esset alia; ergo impossibile est quod idem successivum vel transiens repararetur. . . . [P]artes autem successionis sunt prius et posterius, vel potius prioritas et posterioritas. . . . [E]rgo pars motus que preterit posset iterum reparari vere, habitudo prioritatis efficeretur habitudo posteritatis, quod est impossibile” (ed. Jeschke, p. 38).

Durand, *In Sent.* IV, d. 43, q. 2: “[Q]uando aliquid dependet ab alio per se et ex necessitate, multiplicato eo, necessario ipsum oportet multiplicari; set forma producta per se et ex necessitate dependet a sua productione. . . ergo plurificata actione necesse est formam productam plurificari. Constat autem quod alia actio secundum numerum est illa per quam res primo producitur et illa per quam secundo reparatur; ergo et forma, que est terminus prime productionis, est alia secundum numerum ab illa que est terminus secunde. Quod autem ille actiones sint due et non una, patet, quia quelibet illarum uel est motus uel mutatio sequens motum; set motus qui sunt in diuersis temporibus et mutationes sequentes tales motus sunt ex necessitate diuersi motus et diuersae mutationes quantum est de cursu nature” (ed. Jeschke, pp. 22–23).

4. The third one of the aforesaid, namely that God can repair a permanent thing the same in number if it ceases to exist or is annihilated, is easily shown from what was said before, this way: because if he cannot [i.e., repair it], then it is either because of a contradiction from the part of the thing, as was said above about successive things; or because of the impotence of the doer, as was said above about permanent things from the part of natural agents. But in the present question neither of these is the case, because a permanent thing can exist the same now and before, but God can bring it about that something exists successively in two extremes without existing in the middle, not only in forms but also in places, as perhaps it was the case in the virgin birth and in Christ's body rising from the grave and entering to the disciples through shut doors. And the same should be judged about times; therefore, etc.
5. To the third, it should be said that the analogy between being in time and being in place does not hold, because being in time, as we take it, is only according to coexistence, namely that the thing is when the time is, whether the time is measured or not; and therefore nothing can lack being in time or in a part of time, except by letting go of its existence, which, having let go of, a thing cannot be repaired the same. . . . But being in place is not being when the place is, but it is to have some relation to the place, either according to commensuration (as is the case with that which is in a place locally), or according to some other order (as is the case with the body of Christ, which is under the host sacramentally, as was previously determined). Therefore, since a body, without letting go of its proper existence, can be commensurated with some place and have some other relation to a distant place without having a similar relation to the place in the middle, the same body can be in distant places without being in the middle.

John of Naples, *Quodl.* VI, q. 7: "Tertiam predictorum trium, scilicet quod Deus permanens si desinit vel annihilatur potest idem numero reparare, probatur ex predictis facilliter sic: quia si hoc non possit, aut hoc esset propter repugnantium ex parte rei, sicut dictum est supra de successivis; aut propter impotentiam ex parte facientis, sicut dictum est de permanentibus ex parte agentium naturalium. Sed neutram potest dici in proposito, quia permanens potest esse idem nunc et prius, Deus autem potest facere quod aliquid sit successive in duobus extremis et non in medio, non solum formis sed etiam locis, sicut forte factum est in partu virginis et egressu corporis Christi de sepulcro et ingressu ad discipulos ianuis clausis. Et idem iudicium est de temporibus; ergo etc." (Vat. Lat. ms. 772, 98rb).

Durand, *In Sent.* IV, d. 43, q. 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de esse in tempore et esse in loco, quia esse in tempore, ut nunc large accipimus, est solum secundum coexistentiam, scilicet quod res est dum tempus est, sive mensuretur tempore sive non; et ideo tempori vel parti temporis nichil potest deesse nisi amittendo suum esse, quo amisso res non potest eadem reparari. . . . Esse autem in loco non est esse quando locus est, set est habere aliquam habitudinem ad locum, vel secundum commensurationem, ut est illud quod est in loco localiter, vel secundum alium ordinem, ut est de corpore Christi, quod est sub hostia sacramentaliter, prout in precedentibus determinatum est. Cum igitur corpus absque amissione proprii esse possit commensurari alicui loco et habere aliquam aliam habitudinem ad locum distantem absque simili habitudine ad medium, ideo idem corpus potest esse in locis distantibus absque eo quod sit in loco medio" (ed. Jeschke, pp. 47-48).